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Retirement Responses to a Generous Pension Reform: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Eastern Europe
* 
 
The retirement decision is under researched in developing and emerging countries, despite 
the topic’s close relation to many development issues such as poverty reduction and social 
security, and despite the fact that population ageing will increasingly challenge the 
developing world. This paper uses a natural experiment from Ukraine to estimate the causal 
effect of a threefold increase in the legal minimum pension on labor supply and retirement 
behaviour at older ages. Applying difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity 
methods on two independent nationally representative data sets, the paper estimates a pure 
income effect that caused additional retirement of 30 to 47 percent. Additional evidence 
suggests that retirement incentives are stronger at the lower tail of the educational 
distribution and that the strict Labor Code curbed responses at the intensive labor supply 
margin. Although the substantial pension increase provided strong disincentives to work and 
put a heavy fiscal burden on Ukraine, it significantly reduced the propensity of falling into 
poverty for those in retirement. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J26, I38, O15 
  
Keywords:  labor supply, retirement, minimum pension, pure income effect, poverty, 





Alexander M. Danzer 
Royal Holloway College 
University of London 
Department of Economics 
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: A.M.Danzer@rhul.ac.uk   
 
                                                 
* The author is grateful for valuable comments by Peter Dolton, Lars Handrich, Victor Lavy, Melanie 
Lührmann, Omer Moav, Robert Moffitt, Robert Poppe, Kenneth Troske, Jonathan Wadsworth, Natalia 
Weisshaar, seminar participants at Royal Holloway, OEI Regensburg, ZEW Mannheim and conference 
participants at EALE Tallinn and at the 11
th IZA/CEPR ESSLE meeting Buch. The ULMS data were 
kindly made available by the ESCIRRU consortium. All remaining errors are mine. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The retirement decision is under researched in developing and emerging countries, 
despite the topic’s  relevance  for many  development issues such as poverty  reduction and 
social security, and despite the fact that population ageing will increasingly challenge the 
developing  world.  This  paper  analyses  the  question  how  increasing  generosity  of  old-age 
pension provision impacts on the retirement decision at older ages in a poor country. A unique 
natural experiment allows disentangling the pure income effect from pension generosity in 
unusual clarity. Estimates of the income effect of labor supply are valuable as many poor 
countries see the improvement of pension systems as a crucial tool in the fight against poverty 
(cp. Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; Barr and Diamond, 2008). 
In developing and emerging countries, insufficient old-age income provision is paired 
with  underdeveloped  or  missing  financial  markets  hampering  private  pension  provision.
1 
Although  a  number  of  emerging  countries  have  successfully  introduced  non-contributory 
pensions with broad coverage (Willmore, 2007; Barr and Diamond, 2008) very little is known 
about the labor market and retirement effects of pension systems in the developing world.
2 In 
contrast,  the  potential  disincentive  effects  for  the  labor  supply  of  older  people  is  well-
documented  for  many  industrialized  countries  (Gruber  and  Wise,  2004),  although  the 
literature remains ambiguous about the impact of social security systems on labor supply 
behaviour (e.g. Moffitt, 1987; Krueger and Pischke, 1992). On institutional grounds, Freeman 
(2009) reviews some recent evidence on the pass-through of pension contribution rules on 
labor costs and labor demand in a number of developing countries. Barr and Diamond (2008) 
discuss  some  pension  and  retirement  features  for  developing  countries  like  relatively  low 
retirement ages, widespread use of early retirement and the coverage problem of the informal 
sector. However, behavioural responses to cash transfers and retirement rules in developing 
countries are even less researched. Probably the best studied country is South Africa, where 
the availability of  good cross-sectional and  (lately) panel data has stimulated research on 
various aspects of labor supply and income pooling of the old-age social pension (Bertrand et 
al., 2003; Duflo, 2003; Ardington et al., 2009); however, all the papers deal with the labor 
supply  responses  of  working-age  adults  in  multi-generation  households.  McKee  (2008) 
focuses on old-age labor supply in response to family transfers in Indonesia and simulates the 
                                                 
1  Where  they  exist  in  the  developing  world,  pension  systems  are  mostly  characterized  by  insufficient 
replacement rates and low coverage due to poor administrative capacities, informality and wide-spread self-
employment. 
2 The small retirement literature contrasts with an increasing literature on labour market regulations and their 
effect on labor market outcomes in developing and emerging countries (e.g. Harrison and Leamer, 1997). 3 
 
potential  welfare  gains  from  a  defined-contribution  system.  The  only  direct  evidence  on 
retirement responses to social security receipt is the evaluation of a multi-faceted change in 
the  pension  eligibility  rule  for  rural  workers  in  Brazil  (de  Carvalho  Filho,  2008).  A 
simultaneous  change  in  several  pension  eligibility  criteria—among  them  a  doubling  in 
minimum  benefits—reduced  male  labor  supply  by  roughly  38  percentage  points.
3  Costa 
(1995) provides evidence on a pure income effect from the turn-of-the-century Union Army 
Veteran Pension; however, pension receipt was then based on health status.  
This  paper  exploits  the  exogenous  income  variation  provided  by  an  unforeseen 
departure  from  the  pension  reform  track,  upon  which  the  government  of  Ukraine  had 
embarked the country. Ukraine is a lower middle income country with a GDP of 5,300 USD 
per capita PPP in 2003 (comparable to Peru and China) equalling 14 percent of the US level. 
In 2002 a comprehensive pension reform had been approved in order to reduce the fiscal 
burden of the pension system, which has always been characterized by full coverage of the 
population and low retirement ages.  In September 2004, reform objectives were suddenly 
changed  with  probably  one  of  the  world’s  largest  pension  increases  being  implemented. 
Pensioners in Ukraine saw a threefold increase in the legal minimum pension, resulting in an 
almost universal flat benefit rate which was paid out upon reaching retirement age without 
any means or retirement testing. In early 2005, almost all pensioners in Ukraine received 
exactly the new minimum pension benefit which amounted to roughly 65 USD.  
The  estimated  labor  supply  and  retirement  effects  have  a  causal  interpretation  by 
comparing the retirement behaviour of those slightly above the statutory retirement age before 
and after the pension increase (the treatment). The counterfactual is given by those slightly 
below  retirement  age.  As  old-age  pensions  are  neither  means-tested  nor  conditioned  on 
retirement,  the  rise  in  benefit  levels  will  induce  a  pure  income  effect,  which  enables  an 
individual to afford more leisure (under the assumption that leisure is a normal good) (cp. 
Costa 1995). After controlling for trends in general labor supply over time, the coefficient on 
the interaction between the treatment group dummy and the treatment indicator reflects the 
income effect of the pension increase.  
The  paper  offers  three  contributions:  First,  it  carefully  identifies  the  labor  supply 
response  to  a  substantial  pension  increase  at  the  extensive  and  intensive  margin  using  a 
Difference-in-Difference  as  well  as  a  Difference-in-Regression-Discontinuity  design.  The 
                                                 
3 One disadvantage of the Brazilian data is that the type of pension benefits (old-age, disability, social assistance) 
cannot be accurately determined. Different from the Brazilian reforms (de Carvalho Filho, 2008), the current 
analysis can also rule out incentive effects from additional years of services. As benefits do not depend on 
contributions the individual retirement decision  won’t be  confounded by the change  in prospective pension 
accruals. 4 
 
robustness of the results across two independent data sources, different estimation methods 
and a number of sensitivity tests is a reassuring indicator not only in a developing country 
setting.  Second,  this  paper  presents  results  for  an  emerging  country  where  the  entire 
population is affected from a change in the pension legislation. Ukraine is a lower-middle 
income country
4 and thus represents the group of countries containing the majority of the 
global population (including countries like China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nigeria). 
The  paper  thus  adds  evidence  beyond  the  pre-existing  small  literature  on  higher-middle 
income  countries  and  complements  analyses  on  pension  changes  that  apply  to  some 
population subgroups only. Also, the paper offers some evidence on the magnitude of the 
poverty reduction induced by the reform. Third, unlike much of the earlier literature, this 
paper analyses retirement decisions of both, men and women.  
The results of this study indicate that higher pension incomes have strong disincentive 
effects  on  the  labor  supply  decision  of  elderly  people.  The  income  effect  from  the  new 
pension policy leads to a 37-47 percent increase in retirement at the statutory retirement age 
for  men—and  to  a  30-39  percent  increase  for  women.  Those  women  who  remain  in  the 
workforce reduce their yearly working hours by 15 percent, while men have no significant 
response at the intensive labor margin. The estimated effects are substantially stronger for less 
educated  than  for  better-educated.  As  retirement  effects  are  estimated  purely  on  age 
eligibility,  these  figures  can  be  regarded  as  lower  bound  estimates.  While  the  respective 
retirement elasticities with respect to pension income are somewhat lower than previously 
reported in the literature (at 0.32), elasticities estimated on actual benefit receipt are twice as 
large.  From  a  welfare  perspective,  the  pension  increase  has  significantly  reduced  elderly 
poverty in absolute terms, but has also improved the old generation’s position relative to the 
working age population.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set, the 
main  features  of  the  Ukrainian  pension  system  including  details  on  the  generous  pension 
increase of the year 2004. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy used in this paper and 
presents the main  retirement and labor supply  results with several robustness tests. Results 
concerning absolute and relative deprivation are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
with some implications for public policy.  
 
                                                 
4 According to the World Bank‘s Atlas method. 5 
 
 
2.  The Legal Minimum Pension Increase in Ukraine 
 
Pension Reform 
Ukraine has a mandatory defined benefit state pension system which is in practice 
exclusively based on qualification by age. It covers all Ukrainians who have worked for at 
least 20 (women) or 25 years (men) and who have reached retirement age. By international 
comparisons, the state pension age is low with women qualifying from age of 55 and men 
from age of 60.
5 For the near future, the system will resemble a non-contributory pension 
scheme,  as  those  Ukrainians  close  to  retirement  age  have  accumulated  most  of  their 
employment histories during the Soviet era and in a labor market that was characterized by 
full employment and high wage compression. Consequently, coverage of the system has been 
almost universal.  
In the early 2000s, the Ukrainian pension system was characterized by an extremely 
high level of benefit compression. Pension benefits had been capped at three times the legal 
minimum wage (plus minor additions) resulting in an almost flat pension rate (Noel et al., 
2006). At the same time the state pension scheme offered at minimum pension guarantee to 
support those who receive low benefits.  
In 2002, the government discussed and ratified a comprehensive pension reform which 
aimed at better incentives for later retirement (by paying additions for pension deferral) and 
for compliance in contribution payments of high-income earners (by removing the pension 
cap) in order to ease the fiscal strain of the system.
6 The reform came into force in January 
2003. 
In  September  2004,  however,  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  suddenly  increased  the 
minimum pension level per decree in an attempt to reduce poverty among the elderly.
7 In 
nominal terms, the guaranteed floor rose from around 100 Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH) per 
month to over 280 UAH in late 2004 and almost 350 UAH (roughly 65 USD) in early 2005 
(Figure  1).  As  minimum  wages  did  not  keep  track  of  this  rise,  the  guaranteed  minimum 
pension even exceeded the legal minimum wage after September 2004. While the general 
                                                 
5 There are several hazardous occupations in which the normal retirement age is below the stated values, e.g., in 
mining.  Similarly  low  retirement  ages  prevail  in  China,  most  transition  countries,  but  for  instance  also  in 
Colombia and El Salvador. 
6 The future pension system was designed to rest on three pillars, with the first one resembling a mandatory pay-
as-you-go state pension system, the second one being a mandatory individual pension and the third one being 
private pension insurance. The second pillar was scheduled to start after 2007, while the other two pillars were 
scheduled for 2003 (for details see Handrich and Betliy, 2006). Contributions for the PAYG system are made by 
employees (1-2 percent) and employers (32 percent). Fiscal imbalances are smoothed out by budget subsidies. 
7 CM Decree on Improving the Pension Provision Level, No.1215. 6 
 
reform  had  been  designed  to  remove  the  cap  on  the  state  pension,  the  sharp  rise  in  the 
minimum pension introduced a binding pension floor: Average wage earners with 40 years of 
working history suddenly received no more than the minimum pension, and consequently 88 
percent (!) of the 13.3 million pensioners in Ukraine received a flat benefit rate (World Bank, 
2005). Albeit at a higher absolute level, overall benefit compression had further increased 
(Figure 2).  
Even  for  the  national  pension  fund,  which  had  to  administer  the  change,  the 
government’s step to increase the minimum guarantee level came as a surprise. In previous 
months, the fund had struggled with the government about insufficient transfers from the 
State Budget and threatened to no longer pay out benefits. As the institutional ambiguity in 
the  financing  of  pensions  became  increasingly  public,  many  people  might  not  even  have 
expected to receive their full pension benefits in mid 2004. The sudden pension increase was 
implemented  without  following  the  usual  legal  procedures  in  time  and  the  government 
codified  the  higher  pension  rights  only  in  April  2005  by  amending  Article  28  on  the 
“Minimum old age pension” of the State Pension Law.
8 The abruptness of the pension rise is 
well  documented  and  most  observers  immediately  expressed  concern  that  this  step  might 
thwart the government’s reform attempts (Kotusenko, 2004; World Bank, 2005; Gora, 2008). 
The  timing  of  the  pension  increase  just  few  months  before  the  general  elections 
generated rumours that the government had recognized pensioners as a powerful electorate 
(Handrich and Betliy, 2006). Pensioners have often been considered the losing generation of 
the post-Socialist transition process. However, contrary to the public perception, there is no 
empirical  evidence  pointing  to  pensioners  being  more  poverty  exposed  than  other  social 
groups in Ukraine or Russia, especially when measured in terms of consumption (Mroz and 
Popkin, 1995; Brück, Danzer, Muravyev and Weisshaar, forthcoming). 
Official  data  give  a  first  impression  of  the  effect  of  the  pension  increase  at  the 
aggregate level. According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, the share of pensions 
in total household resources stagnated around 23 percent between 2000 and 2003, and then 
jumped by five percentage points in and after the reform year 2004 to remain relatively stable 
thereafter.  As  will  be  discussed  later,  aggregate  data  might  mask  household  composition 
effects  so  that  the  substantial  increase  of  pensions  in  total  household  incomes  does  not 
                                                 
8 The amendment reads as follows: „From 12 January 2005, in accordance with an earlier implemented change 
to Article 28 of the Ukrainian Law „On Mandatroy State Pensions Insurance“, the provision of the minimal old-
age pension, which applies from a minimum of 25 service years for men and 20 service years for women, will be 
adjusted to the subsistence minimum which applies for persons who have lost their income generating capacity 
(332 UAH).“ (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2006, 36) 7 
 
necessarily  reflect  the  pure  effect  of  the  pension  increase.
9  Given  this  generous  pension 
increase allied to a progressively ageing population, the fiscal burden of old-age pensions on 
the public budget in Ukraine became substantial.
10 Total expenditures on the pension system 
increased from nine to 15 percent of GDP between 2003 and 2005 (Gora, 2008: 34). The 
comparable figure for the OECD average was 7.2 percent of GDP in 2005 (OECD, 2009: 
138) and even countries with very mature pension systems like Germany  or France have 
shares of around ten percent. Although the fiscal burden and demographic challenge of the 
Ukrainian pension system might seem obvious, its costs have to be understood in the light of 
its  achievements  (see  Barr  and  Diamond,  2008).  Consequently,  this  study  also  aims  at 
analyzing whether the pension increase has achieved the announced public policy objective of 
poverty reduction.  
However, the main contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of unintended labor 
supply consequences of the reform. In comparison to industrialized countries, the shares of 
working pensioners are high in Ukraine. Two years above statutory retirement age (i.e., at 62 
and 57 years of age), roughly 40 percent of men and women have regular employment, and 
that  share  halves  within  the  next  three  years.  Traditionally,  the  phenomenon  of  working 
pensioners  was  attributed  to  the  insufficient  pension  entitlements  of  many  elderly,  as 
evidenced  for  Russia  (Kolev  and  Pascal,  2002).  Additionally,  working  relations  are  still 
inflexible in Ukraine and most individuals face the choice between working full time or not at 
all. As a consequence, labor supply responses in Ukraine take predominantly place at the 
extensive margin and people might work more than actually desired. If poverty was the cause 
of the elderly staying at work, a significant non-anticipated pension increase like the one in 
2004 should allow more pension-aged to afford retirement without falling into poverty. 
                                                 
9 Those composition effects can only stem from changing co-residency patterns of households and not from 
population ageing per se, as the share of pensioners in the total population remained roughly stable over the 
period under consideration. 
10 There have been debates about increasing the statutory retirement age, however, the Ukrainian Prime Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko announced on her private homepage in 2007, that no such increase would be introduced due 




3.  Retirement response to the pension increase 
 
Data 
The  analysis  is  based  on  several  cross  sections  (2002-2006)  of  the  national 
representative  Ukrainian  Household  Budget  Survey  (UHBS)  which  interviews  25,000 
individuals on an annual basis. Data collection is performed by the State Statistics Committee 
of  Ukraine  in  December  of  each  year.  The  data  comprise  a  rich  set  of  individual  and 
household characteristics, information on employment as well as incomes. A drawback of the 
data set is the way how earnings and pensions are retrieved. Individuals are asked to report 
net yearly earnings and pension benefits. As a consequence, the effect of a pension increase in 
late 2004 will show up only partially in the December 2004 data. Consequently, December 
2005 values are used as post-reform observations, since the pension increase was only fully 
reflected in the 2005 wave. Unfortunately, the UHBS lacks information on working hours; 
however,  the  persistent  structural  inflexibility  of  the  Ukrainian  labor  market  allows  little 
choice at the intensive margin of labour supply. Consequently, most workers are contracted 
full-time with 40 hours per week, and the reduction of working hours is constrained by the 
vast  majority  of  employers  who  are  reluctant  to  provide  part-time  jobs.  More  than  sixty 
(almost fifty) percent of employees worked exactly 40 hours in an average (the reference) 
working week and the concentration on full time is even more pronounced for those working 
beyond retirement age (Figure 3). The pattern is similar for men and women and there is no 
significant change between 2003 and 2007.
11  
The analysis of working hours is feasible in the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (ULMS), a panel data set which is complementarily used to overcome some of the 
data limitations of the UHBS. The nationally representative ULMS is collected by the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology. All three waves of the panel (for the years 2003, 2004 
and 2007) are used in the analysis. As the vast majority of data collection is performed in 
early summer (May to July), the panel comprises two waves prior to and one wave after the 
exogenous pension increase. The data set allows a comprehensive analysis of labor market 
responses as it contains information on working hours, number of working weeks as well as 
monthly  net  incomes.  Also,  the  use  of  panel  data  allows  us  to  control  for  unobservable 
                                                 
11 The share of those working between 15 and 25 hours is higher among working age women (7 percent) than 
among working age men (3 percent) and higher among pension aged women (12 percent) than among pension 
aged men (8 percent). 9 
 
individual characteristics which might impact on labor supply behaviour in a way that is non-
traceable when using cross-sectional data.  
The main variable of interest in the analysis will be the retirement status based on an 
activity-income-centred  definition.  A  person  is  retired  if  not  working,  receiving  old-age 
pension benefits and subjectively self-categorizing him- or herself as retiree. Labor supply 
intensity  is  measured  in  hours  per  year,  weeks  per  year  and  hours  per  week.  A  detailed 
description of variable definitions in both data sets can be found in Table 1. 
 
Identification Strategy 
In Ukraine, one can draw a pension upon reaching retirement age (55 for women and 
60 for men).  Legally, the second requirement for pension eligibility is a minimum of 20 
(women)  or  25  (men)  years  of  work.  The  UHBS  data  set  contains  information  on  total 
working  years, i.e. the  years worked throughout lifetime, which shows that only  a minor 
fraction of those reaching retirement age has worked fewer than the required 20/25 years as a 
consequence of the Soviet full-employment policy (1.9 percent of women and 2.0 percent of 
men).
12 In order to maintain a purely exogenous pension age indicator, all presented results 
are not conditioned on the minimum working years requirement.
13 Consistent across both data 
sets and all years, the share of pension aged exceeds the share of those receiving an old age 
pension  by  one  to  two  percentage  points.  Beside  pensions  arrears  (which  were  almost 
negligible during the observation period), the difference mainly stems  from pension aged 
individuals who kept working without drawing the compulsory state pension, for instance, if 
they were not registered at their current place of residence. To circumvent potential selection 
bias into actual pension receipt of the elderly the following analysis uses age-based pension 
eligibility as an instrument for actual benefit receipt. 
The  identification  strategy  of  this  paper  exploits  a  natural  experiment  in  Ukraine. 
Using  the  unanticipated  minimum  pension  increase  as  a  treatment  to  those  receiving  a 
pension, the income effect on labor supply choices and retirement behaviour of those close to 
pension age can be interpreted as a causal effect. Figure 4 and 5 show retirement rates for one 
year prior and one year post pension reform on the y-axis. The full dots mark the year 2003 
while the circles stand for the year 2005. On the x-axis, age is reported with a vertical line 
                                                 
12 Actually one would prefer to have a measure of years with pension contributions. Although informal sector 
employment might be substantial in current Ukraine, the largest fraction of those close to the retirement age have 
reached the minimum year requirement already during Soviet times. For instance, men born in 1944 who had 
started working in 1964 had already 27 years of working experience when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991. 
13  Robustness checks excluding those with below 20/25 years of work experience from the eligibility criterion 
indeed confirm that the true effect is economically and statistically slightly bigger (see robustness check 2 of 
Table 25). 10 
 
marking the gender-specific retirement age. The fitted values in the graphs are predicitions 
from weighted polynomial regressions. For both, men and women, we observe some early 
retirement to the left of the retirement discontinuity. The differences in the predicted values 
are modest below pension age. Above retirement age, however, there is an apparent upward 
shift in retirement rates after the reform year 2004. The discontinuity exactly at the retirement 
age has widened significantly between 2003 and 2005. This gap (and not the change from 
below retirement age to above retirement age) is the retirement response of the minimum 




The Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimator exploits the discontinuity in pension 
eligibility at retirement age to compare changes in outcomes between those eligible (treatment 
group) and those not yet eligible (control group) for an old-age pension over time. Keeping in 
mind that the analysis is purely based on pension eligibility, the presented effects have to be 
understood  as  lower  bound  estimates  of  the  true  effect.  The  treatment  of  interest  is  the 
threefold increase in benefits and we are interested in its impact on the outcomes of interest, 
retirement  and  labor  supply  intensity  in  the  treatment  group.  As  a  pure  before-after 
comparison of outcomes among the treatment group might be affected by time specific factors 
that are common to all workers, the control group is used to difference away general trends in 
retirement behaviour, e.g., changing macroeconomics conditions and aggregate labor demand. 
The timing of the pension increase allows using two cross sections of the UHBS before and 
after the reform, however, to prevent from other potentially confounding factors, the analysis 
is cleanest when performed on two cross-sections before (2002/2003) and one cross-section 
after  the  pension  increase  (2005).  Table  2  shows  the  identification  strategy  by  mean 
comparisons in two-by-two matrices. The upper panel indicates that women exhibit lower 
retirement rates than men across all cells. Also, the retirement effect of reaching retirement 
age is stronger for men (47 percentage points) as compared to women (44 percentage points). 
The  time  trend  for  those  below  retirement  age  is  (insignificantly)  negative,  reflecting  the 
increasing labor force participation during the growth period of the mid 2000s in Ukraine. 
However, for those above retirement age, the time trend runs in the opposite direction, leading 
to an even larger treatment effect of 17.6 percentage points for men and 13.3 percentage 
points for women. Caused by the pension increase, retirement rates rose by 37 and 30 percent. 
The two lower panels report results from two falsification exercises, the first one simulating 11 
 
an artificial retirement age at 58 (for men) and 53 (for women) and the second simulating the 
pension increase between the years 2002 and 2003. The first control experiment indicates that 
early retirement rates generally increased with age but remained fairly stable over years. The 
negative time trend at younger ages reflects the general positive employment trend. Control 
experiment two shows that changes between 2002 and 2003 were modest and insignificantly 
different  from  zero.  The  only  puzzling  effect  is  the  (almost  weakly  significant)  apparent 
increase in early retirement between 2002 and 2003 for men. However, there are good reasons 
to believe that this effect is driven by compositional changes of the relatively small male 
sample.
14 We will turn to greater details now.  
The simple mean estimates can be generalized in a regression framework in order to 
test the robustness of the results with respect to the inclusion of covariates:
15 
 
y = β0 + β1P + β2T + β3P*T + β‘X + u              (1) 
 
with y being the dependent variable (retirement or labor supply), P being an indicator 
for pension eligibility (as compared to the non-eligibility N), T being an indicator for the post-
treatment period (i.e. the years 2004 and 2005 for UHBS as well as 2007 for ULMS) and P*T 
being an interaction effect of P and T. X is a vector of individual, household and regional 
controls including marital status, education, tenure, health status, household size, a dummy 
for the presence of children up to age seventeen, the presence of a household member in 
invalidity status, household income of other working age adults, regional industry structure, 
settlement  type  as  well  as  larger  regional  fixed  effects.  If  the  pension  increase  was  truly 
exogenous and anticipated, the inclusion of covariates should lead to only modest changes of 
the results presented so far. General differences in retirement rates between pension eligible 
and  non-eligible  individuals  are  captured  by  β1.  For  males,  it  compares  retirement  rates 
between workers aged 58 and 59 and workers aged 61 and 62, while it compares women aged 
53 and 54 with women slightly above retirement age, 56 and 57 years old.
16 The β2 reflects 
                                                 
14 When including standard controls in the regression version of the DiD (see Table 3), the estimated effect 
shrinks to -0.053 (s.e. 0.066). 
15  The  model  of  retirement  is  estimated  with  a  linear  probability  model.  As  a  robustness  check  a  probit 
formulation  of  the  model  is  applied,  which  yields  slightly  larger  marginal  fixed  effects  (Table 25).  Recent 
advances  in  the  econometric  literature  have  suggested  the  use  of  bounded  estimation  for  discrete  DiD  as 
counterfactual values might potentially become negative in the binary case (Athey and Imbens, 2006). In the 
current analysis, this concern is of less relevance as retirement levels of an appropriate control group are not 
expected to change radically over time.  
16 As the UHBS lacks information on exact birth dates, all those aged exactly the retirement age are excluded 
from the sample. Generally, it would be desirable to further control for individual unobserved heterogeneity in 
the labor supply responses of individuals. This can principally be done using the ULMS; however, the smaller 
sample size requires a broader choice of comparison age groups (four years). A drawback of the ULMS data is 12 
 
common changes between treatment and control group over time which are independent of 
the scheduled policy, e.g., a rising trend in labor force participation over time. Hence, the 
approach relies on the assumption that there is no shock to the labor market which affects the 
two groups differently.
17 The coefficient of interest is the difference-in-difference estimator β3 
which reports the average treatment effect on those who are eligible for the treatment:  
 
( ) ( ) 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 N N P P y y y y - - - = b                 (2) 
 
If  the  presence  of  the  treatment  after  2004  is  associated  with  increased  retirement 
rates,  this  coefficient  should  be  positive  and  significantly  different  from  zero.  As  higher 
benefits are paid to all claimants without means or retirement testing, the treatment effect can 
be  interpreted  as  a  pure  income  effect  of  the  pension  increase.  A  comprehensive  way  of 
controlling  for  various  composition  effects  is  by  estimating  equation  (1)  while  stepwise 
including sets of covariates. Table 3 reports results from this DiD estimation and confirms 
that  pension  eligible  individuals  had  higher  retirement  rates  after  the  reform.  While  the 
inclusion  of  covariates  substantially  improves  the  fit  of  the  regressions,  the  size  of  the 
coefficient of interest decreases only very modestly. Given the general improvements of the 
welfare situation of Ukrainian households during the 2000s, one might argue that the results 
are  driven  by  welfare  gains  stemming  from  other  household  members.  However,  income 
sources  generated  by  younger  co-residing  adults  are  controlled  for  in  columns  5  and  6. 
Additionally,  when  restricting  the  sample  to  households  without  co-residing  working  age 
adults the findings are qualitatively the same.
18 The inclusion of health controls in column 4 
also  clearly  indicates  that  the  observed  retirement  effect  is  not  driven  by  a  general 
deteriorating health situation of the population, although Ukraine has indeed experienced a 
severe health crisis during the transition process. 
The bottom panel of the regression table replicates the control experiment 2 for men 
and women under the stepwise inclusion rule for covariates. As before, no indication for a 
structural change between 2002 and 2003 is found. The initially suspicious coefficient for 
men drops considerably and remains insignificant as briefly discussed above. 
                                                                                                                                                          
the gap in the observation period. The first post-reform observation is in 2007 and thus already two and a half 
years after the reforms took place. On the one hand this gives us the opportunity to test whether the measured 
effects have some persistence; on the other hand, it becomes harder to interpret the size of the treatment effects. 
17 There is no evidence, that the implementation of the pension rise was financed through rising income taxes in 
the short run, which could potentially affect labor supply behavior of working age persons. 
18 Results are available from the author upon request. 13 
 
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that the comparison between retirement 
rates of those immediately below retirement age over time is a suitable counterfactual for the 
treatment group. There are a couple of reasons to believe that this assumption is true for the 
Ukrainian case, although the assumption itself remains untestable. As pension ages are rather 
low in Ukraine, it seems reasonable to compare individuals shortly before and shortly after 
reaching  the  retirement  age  threshold  without  the  risk  of  comparing  adults  of  different 
physical  ability  to  work.  The  two  groups  also  show  little  differences  in  most  observable 
characteristics except for those that are directly related to age (age, years of work experience, 
widowhood) (Table 4), however, one might fear that unobservable characteristics differ. The 
main concern stems from the substantial educational expansion that took place in the Soviet 
Union between 1958 and 1961 and which aimed at providing every Soviet citizen with at least 
a  basic  secondary  degree.  The  male  cohorts  analyzed  in  this  paper  were  affected  by  this 
expansion and a rising share of secondary educational degrees can be detected among men 
between the years 2003 and 2005 (see Appendix).
19 As better educated individuals retire later 
in  Ukraine—a  finding  consistent  across  data  sets  and  waves—the  compositional  change 
directly  impacts  retirement  rates.  Controlling  for  educational  attainments  does  not 
convincingly solve this problem as the within comparison will provide a misleading picture; it 
cannot be ruled out that some highly able youth were left without secondary degree in earlier 
cohorts  due  to  the  lack  of  educational  facilities  while  their  younger  fellows  were  better 
educated. However, the potential bias introduced by the educational expansion will lead to 
underestimating  the  retirement  effect  of  the  pension  increase  as  better  educated  younger 
cohorts should exhibit retirement rates that are lower than they would have been under the 
same educational composition as slightly older cohorts. Consequently, estimates for men are 
expected to be downward biased. 
Table 5 gives further insights into the nature of the pension increase by comparing 
several  subgroups.  The  table  investigates  three  hypotheses:  First,  we  are  interested  into 
whether women respond differently to the reform than men. As mentioned before, women 
retire slower than men (a setting that is quite unusual for most countries of the world but 
probably related to the especially severe health crisis of men), but given their relatively lower 
labor incomes they might incure stronger retirement incentives from the equalizing pension 
increase. The first two columns replicate the basic result for men and women. The bottom line 
reports the F statistics of a Chow test and clearly rejects the equality of the coefficients.  
                                                 
19 Women in these affected cohorts were already older than the treatment group.  14 
 
Second, one can use the exogenous pension increase to study the relationship between 
health status and retirement. By definition, individuals with health conditions that result in the 
inability to perform work are excluded from the current analysis (by excluding individuals 
with disability status). The question remains whether those with reduced working capacities 
differ in their response to the pension increase from those without any impediments. Research 
investigating the impact of health status on retirement is complicated by reporting bias and the 
potential endogeneity of health status. Health at older ages is—among other determinants—a 
consequence of individual decisions taken throughout life. Empirical evidence suggests that 
chronically ill persons retire earlier as a consequence of lower labor market returns and higher 
disutility from working (Currie and Madrian, 1999). Given that chronically ill persons will be 
more likely to retire early, they should be less responsive to retirement incentives at older 
ages. As columns (3) and (4) suggest, this is the case. Upon reaching retirement age, more 
than 80 percent of the chronically ill are already out of the labor force and the treatment 
coefficient remains insignificant. Despite the small sample size, the Chow test again rejects 
the equality of the coefficients. This analysis suggests that the measurement of the pension 
income effect at normal retirement age has little explanatory power. Thus, in column (5) we 
test  whether  chronically  ill  people  react  at  the  minimum  service  year  threshold  for  early 
retirement (women at 20 years, men at 25 years). Therefore, interactions between dummies 
indicating service time above the minimum threshold, chronic disease and the post-reform 
period are included in a pooled regression. The coefficient of interest is the triple interaction 
between the three dummies which reports that the reponse to reaching the minimum threshold 
as a chronically ill person after the pension increase equals 19 percentage points of additional 
retirement. 
Finally, poorer regions should benefit stronger from the pension increase since the 
pension increase leveled (the modest) regional variation in pension benefits that existed until 
2003. Due to the substantial geographic variation in Ukraine’s economic structure as well as 
wage and pension levels, a regional comparison is useful. After the pension increase, a flat 
benefit rate applied for virtually every pensioner thus producing variation in the magnitude of 
the pension gain. Columns (6) and (7) confirm that the retirement effect from the pension 
increase was stronger in regions which had an above median pension level growth between 
2003 and 2005 and the difference between the two coefficients is significant. The last two 
columns of the table compare urban and rural residents and find again statistically significant 
different results. However, differences between the urban and rural population can be entirely 
explained  by  composition  effects:  when  adding  the  full  set  of  controls,  the  coefficients 15 
 
converge  closely  to  0.119  for  urban  residents  and  0.124  for  rural  residents,  respectively 
(results not shown). 
As  the  proposed  difference-in-differences  approach  compares  persons  close  to  the 
pension  threshold,  the  estimates  will  be  sensitive  to  any  changes  occurring  among  those 
below pension age. If early retirement incentives were reduced simultaneously with the rise in 
pension benefits, the findings could simply reflect a change in early retirement behavior or in 
occupational  early  retirement  rules  (e.g.  for  cost  reasons).  Early  retirement  is  of  some 
importance in Ukraine, as workers in hazardous occupations (e.g. miners) have been entitled 
to  earlier  retirement  since  Soviet  times.  The  empirical  evidence  on  the  extent  of  early 
retirement remains, however, scant. Luckily, the ULMS allows shedding some light on the 
issue, as all job changes and job quits are recorded retrospectively from 1986 onwards. Of the 
entire 2003 sample, 18.9 percent (1,633 in total) retired between 1986 and 2003 and of those 
8.0 percent retired through an early retirement scheme.
20 However, these numbers mask some 
variation over time: While early retirement schemes were quite common at the end of the 
Soviet period (14 percent of all retirees in 1986), labor market exits through early retirement 
were  substantially  reduced  during  the  1990s.  During  the  period  under  consideration  here 
(2003 to 2005), early retirement exits accounted for five to six percent of total retirement 
exits. However, respondents from hazardous occupations might not consider their retirement 
early if the normal retirement age in these occupations was below the statutory retirement 
age.  Therefore,  an  indicator  for  those  claiming  to  retire  regularly  but  below  the  national 
normal retirement age is constructed.  It turns out that the share of those in early normal 
retirement  is  slightly  above  20  percent  of  all  retirees  per  year  and  this  value  is  virtually 
unchanged since 1996.
21 Early retirement is common in few occupations, especially mining. 
The  mining  sector  is  geographically  concentrated  in  Ukraine  (e.g.,  in  the  Donetsk  and 
Lugansk region), however, excluding the respective regions from the analysis does not change 
any of the presented results (see Table 6, columns 1 and 2). 
The remainder of Table 6 lends more robustness to the retirement results from an 
opportunity  cost  perspective.  For  their  retirement  choice,  individuals  will  compare  their 
potential pension benefits with their forgone earnings. Columns (3) to (6) thus control for a 
“shadow wage” in the form of potential yearly earnings. As the data set provides earnings 
information obviously only for those who actually work, one has to predict the shadow wage 
                                                 
20 Early retirement is self-reported and coded from a multiple answer question. To check consistency of the 
responses, the answers were compared with the computed individual age at retirement. 
21 In the early 1990s, shares were substantially higher. 16 
 
from earnings regressions that account for selectivity into employment.
22 Given the restricted 
information available for both workers and pensioners, the shadow wage is computed for all 
gender-age-education-region cells. As evident from the table, the inclusion of the shadow 
wage changes the treatment effect only negligibly. Some change in coefficients appears as 
long  as covariates are uncontrolled for, which is directly linked to the  way in which the 
shadow wage is computed. Including the shadow wage into the regression is comparable to 
directly controlling for its determinants. In this “raw” version, the coefficient on foregone 
earnings  is  negative,  indicating  that  a  higher  earnings  potential  discourages  immediate 
retirement. Additionally, this negative coefficient picks up the retirement discouraging effect 
from the general increase in wages in Ukraine during the relevant period. While higher labor 
force participation was previously directly reflected in the negative coefficient on the post-
reform dummy, its sign turns after controlling for potential earnings. 
A  potential  threat  to  the  validity  of  the  DiD  estimates  comes  from  household 
composition,  which  is  potentially  responsive  to  the  availability  of  household  resources 
(Edmonds  et  al.,  2005;  Engelhardt  et  al.,  2005).  Under  the  assumption  that  household 
members  pool  their  resources,  changes  in  their  relative  contribution  might  introduce 
incentives to split or unite households. To test for endogeneity in household composition, a 
model similar to (1) is estimated with household size as dependent variable. If households 
were significantly larger or smaller after the reform, we could not reject the hypothesis that 
household composition is responsible for the observed welfare and labor supply patterns. For 
different measures of household composition, the “treatment” effect from the pension increase 
is, however, zero (Table 7). In the ULMS data, one can make use of its panel component and 
detailed  household  roster;  restricting  the  ULMS  analysis  to  households  that  have  not 
experienced a change in composition after the reform year 2004—except for status changes of 
members who ”grew” into retirement age—should provide clean results. As Table 8 shows, 
very  similar  results  are  found  when  excluding  those  rearrangements,  so  that  endogenous 
household formation can safely be ruled out as explaining factor for the observed patterns of 
reduced work among the pension aged.  
Closely connected to the household size decision, is the fact that partners might take 
joint  retirement  decisions.  From  a  theoretical  perspective,  partners  wish  to  customise 
retirement dates for several reasons like complementarities in their utility functions, shared 
tastes as a result of assertive mating or similar economic environment and wealth (Hurd, 
1990).  As  Ukraine  has  a  high  rate  of  female  labor  force  participation,  joint  retirement 
                                                 
22 Using the Heckit approach and pension age as exclusion restriction. 17 
 
decisions will also play a role in this context. Tables 9 and 10 report some descriptive results 
on the joint retirement decision of couples. If anything, it seems that joint retirement increased 
within the joint retirement frontier (the shaded area of Table 10) suggesting that the additional 
income allows couples to synchronise retirement where is was earlier not feasible. 
The  presented  DiD  estimates  are  sensitive  to  a  number  of  methodological  issues, 
among them the choice of the width of the comparison groups around the retirement age. 
Table 11 reports results for  a wide range of bandwidth choices. The values in  column 2 
simply replicate the earlier results. As evidenced in the table, the treatment effect decreases as 
we  use  broader  comparison  groups.  This  seems  reasonable  as  we  include  ever-older  age 
groups in our data aggregate which have already higher pre-reform retirement rates. In other 
words, the absolute additional retirement effect of the pension increase decreases with age as 
already  evidenced  graphically  in  Figure  4  and  5.  The  fact  that  the  basic  results  and  the 
precision of the estimates are preserved in a wide range of settings confirms the robustness of 
the outcomes. 
A threat to the validity of our results from the UHBS data can potentially stem from 
the fact that the sample does not observe the same people over time. In order to show that the 
negative labor supply effect was truly induced by the pension increase, the retirement rates of 
those  slightly  above  retirement  age  should  change  over  time,  while  those  of  the  slightly 
younger control groups should remain unchanged. Figure 6 shows that the labor supply of 
those below retirement age remained roughly constant over the four years between 2002 and 
2006.
23 Quite differently, the share of retirees (up to two years above the statutory retirement 
age) increased between 2003 and 2005 by a fraction comparable to the DiD estimators. More 
formally, Table 12 compares retirement rates to the base year 2002 and tests for statistical 
significant differences. For the control groups below retirement age, the T-statistics remain 
well below two, while retirement rates for the treatment groups are significantly different 
from the base year in 2005 and 2006 (and 2004 for women only) as indicated by the large T 
values. As there were no others policies in place which could favour retirement of those close 
to the pension age, the reduced labor supply can be causally attributed to the increase in the 
legal minimum pension guarantee.  
Throughout the analysis of this paper, age eligibility is used as an instrument for actual 
pension benefit receipt. Using the pension increase interaction as an instrumental variable in a 
two-stage estimation, one can gain insights beyond the reduced form estimation performed so 
far.  Employing  an  activity-based  definition  of  retirement  (i.e.,  a  dummy  variable  for  not 
                                                 
23 Again, the reform year 2004 was excluded. 18 
 
working), a naive estimation of the effect of pension receipt on the participation decision is 
performed in Table 13. The benefit effect is 41 percentage points for men and 36 percentage 
points  for  women.  When  instrumenting  pension  benefit  receipt  by  the  interaction  of 
retirement  age  and  the  post-reform  dummy,  the  coefficient  of  pension  receipt  increases 
substantially to 64 percentage points for men (plus 56 percent) and 44 percentage points for 
women (plus 22 percent).
24 The first stage regression suggests a strong single instrument, 
while using more interactions as instruments is not advisable as the overidentification test 
(Hansen J statistic) rejects validity of additional instruments (not reported).
25 These results are 
suggestive for measurement error in benefit receipt. 
At  the  mean  retirement  rate  the  retirement  elasticity  (∂R/∂B)(B/R)  with  respect  to 
benefit  income  ranges  from  0.32  (when  using  the  benefit  elegibility  rule  in  a  probit 
specification) to 0.66 (when using real benefit receipt). The former is substantially below 
retirement or labor supply elasticites reported elsewhere in the retirement literature, while the 
latter falls between estimates from the 1960s/70s in the US (Krueger and Pischke, 1992) and 
the early 20th century US (Costa, 1995) or Brazil (de Carvalho Filho, 2008). Consistent with 
the previous literature, retirement seems rather inelastic with respect to income shocks. 
 
 
Regression Discontinuity Estimation 
Although we used relatively narrow treatment and control groups, DiD results might 
be biased for functional form reasons. Taking a closer look at the graphs in Figures 4 and 5 
for both men and women pre- and post-reform gives four insights: First, between 2003 and 
2005 the discontinuity in labor force participation at the retirement age threshold widened 
substantially. Second, there are no other structural breaks in the data series. As described in 
the Appendix, estimation density on the left side of the threshold is relatively low for men in 
2003,  explaining  the  less  smooth  behaviour  of  the  scatter  points  below  retirement  age  in 
2003.
26 Third, the picture for women is very similar in both data sets (for men, the sample size 
is too small for producing sensible RD estimates using the ULMS data). This is reassuring as 
we observe the same people in the ULMS data, while cohorts change in the cross-sectional 
UHBS. Fourth, one can derive insights into the functional form around the discontinuity: In 
                                                 
24  Given  the  high  level  of  benefit  compression  there  is  too  little  variation  to  be  exploited  in  benefit  level 
regressions. Therefore, only a dummy variable taking on the value of one if a person receives an old-age pension 
is used here. 
25 Given the small smaple sizes, the use of several instruments would also result in lower efficiency. 
26 Using pooled samples of 2002 and 2003 data vs. 2005 and 2006 data, respectively, produces smoother trends. 
The evolving discontinuity over time remains qualitatively the same.  19 
 
2003 we observe convexity below and concavity above the retirement threshold—the typical 
pattern for a gradual transition of elderly into retirement. Even without any pension system in 
place, we would expect an increasing number of older people exiting the labor force as their 
physical  ability  decreases  etc.  The  pension  increase  in  2004  not  only  introduced  a  wider 
discontinuity,  also  the  speed  of  retirement  at  points  further  away  from  the  threshold  has 
changed. For women, the pre-retirement age path becomes linear and slightly flatter. After the 
reform,  linearity  appears  to  the  right  of  the  threshold  for  men,  while  the  labor  force 
participation function for women remains concave. The change in functional form might bias 
DiD results reported earlier. 
Moving from the DiD to an RD design might improve our estimates, as we allow for 
more flexibility in functional form around the threshold. Also, using more data points might 
add to estimation precision. Upon reaching retirement age, the probability of receiving an old-
age pension (i.e. the binary treatment) jumps discontinuously. The discontinuity used here to 
identify the income effect in the retirement decision is based on an eligibility criterion defined 
by age. Regression discontinuities in age eligibility generally differ from ordinary RD designs 
in that individuals cannot reject the assignment to treatment and in that the assignment to 
treatment is certain (Lee and Lemieux 2009).
27 The basic idea of the sharp RD design is that 
the causal treatment effect of the model  i i i i x y b a + =  can be obtained by comparing mean 
outcomes of those aged slightly above with those slightly below the treatment threshold:
28 
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In  order  to  estimate  the  income  effect  from  the  pension  increase  over  time,  a 
combination  of  two  regression  discontinuity  estimators  generates  the  Regression 
Discontinuity  Difference  (RDD)  estimator.  Using  a  parametric  version  of  the  RD  design 
implemented  by  lower-order  polynomial  regressions,  one  can  estimate  the  change  in  the 
retirement ratio at the retirement age between the pre- and post-reform year:
29 
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27 The basic mechanism and identifying conditions of RD designs are laid out in greater detail in Hahn, Todd and 
van der Klaauw (2001).  
28 The absence of exact date of birth information in UHBS forces me to implement the regression discontinuity 
estimator with relatively broad discrete categories (years of age). Producing evidence form “narrower” discrete 
age variables would be desirable but introduce small sample problems. 
29 In the estimation polynomials of degree two are applied. The age variable is centred at the gender-specific 
retirement age. The results are robust to the use of higher order polynomials.  20 
 
 
As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2009), the validity of the RD design can be checked by 
including covariates, which should neither change the model estimates of interest nor their 
standard errors.  
The results from the visual inspection are confirmed by the various RD regression 
estimates.  Table  14  shows  that  the  retirement  effect  of  the  pension  increase  for  men  is 
significantly positive and very stable when adding covariates in a stepwise fashion. Thus, the 
data confirm the theoretical irrelevance of covariates for the pure income effect (cp. Lee and 
Lemieux,  2009).  Also  for  women,  the  RDD  estimates  confirm  earlier  findings,  although 




Intensive margin of labor supply 
The research on retirement decisions distinguishes between labor supply responses at 
the extensive vs. intensive margin. In the latter case, persons retire gradually and reduce the 
number of working hours or working weeks rather than fully retreating from the labor market. 
The ULMS is a useful data source to uncover changes at the intensive margin, as it 
offers a variety of information on normal and actual working hours during the reference week, 
weeks worked per year as well as information about deviations from the contractual work 
load.
30  As  the  ULMS  is  a  longitudinal  data  set,  the  results  are  not  affected  by  changing 
educational quality of treatment and control group across years as it is possible to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The following analysis is based on three main outcomes, yearly 
working hours, weeks worked per year and weekly working hours. The results suggest some 
strong effects for women and those with low education. 
As briefly mentioned above, labor relations are strongly regulated by the state and the 
Soviet Labor Code which is in force since June 1972 prescribes the average working of 40 
hours.  Again,  regulated  exemptions  apply  in  hazardous  occupations  and,  for  instance,  for 
teachers. Enterprises do generally not seek to allow for more flexibility in working time rules, 
as overtime work must be paid twofold. Part-time work was very untypical during Soviet 
times and employment with reduced working hours is only emerging slowly.
31 As a response, 
                                                 
30 For ULMS results on the retirement decision see Table 8. 
31 The questionnaire layout of the ULMS accounts for this peculiarity. Individuals are asked for their normal 
working hours and whether they normally work 40 hours; if not, respondents can chose from a list of reasons, 
most of which are related to exogneous shocks, like “shortage in work material“ or „sickness“. Almost half of 
those who work less than fourty hours per week report that the shorter working time is considered full-time in 21 
 
working time is more often adjusted through weeks per year rather than hours per week. Still, 
the share of workers who reduced work load rather than fully retired is surprisingly low, and 
the  vast  majority  is  concentrated  in  low  skilled  service  sector  occupations  (with  teachers 
being the only numerous exception).  
As Table 15 shows, women reduce their yearly labor supply of hours by 281 hours or 
on average seventeen percent. However, the effect is strongest for least educated women and 
also applies for least educated men. Workers in the lowest educational group (primary or 
unfinished  secondary  education)  reduce  their  yearly  work  load  by  460  hours,  which  is  a 
substantial minus of 34 percent. These results are confirmed in the regression set-up (Table 
16) and robust to the stepwise inclusion of various control variables (Tables 17 and 18) as 
well as controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by individual fixed effects (Table 19). In boh 
samples, the Hausman test suggests preference of the random effects model over the fixed 
effects model on efficiency grounds. The coefficient from the random effects estimation is 
slightly less precisely estimated, but even larger for those with low education. 
The  results  show  two  interesting  insights:  First,  labor  supply  adjustments  at  the 
intensive margin are predominantly realized through the number of working weeks rather than 
the number of weekly working hours. As Tables 15, 17, 18 and 20 show, working hours 
change relatively little. This suggests that workers adjust labor supply differently when they 
are strongly constrained in their hours’ choice set as is the case in Ukraine. Second, there are 
no labor supply effects at the intensive margin for the male sample which probably relates to 
the gender specific occupational structure in Ukraine. Labor relations in most jobs are strictly 
regulated and reduced working hours are only possible in few (with the exception of teachers 
mostly low skilled) service occupations. Women who reduced their yearly working time by at 
least ten percent of weeks are teaching professionals or employed in elementary service and 
sales occupations. Male teaching professionals, drivers, mobile plant operators as well as craft 
and trade operators were most likely to reduce working weeks by more than ten percent. 
Similarly,  among  those  women  who  reduced  their  weekly  working  hours  by  at  least  25 
percent are predominantly teaching professionals, sales personnel and elementary service and 
sales occupations. Men who work as drivers, mobile plant operators, craft and trade operators 
as  well  as  in  elementary  service  and  sales  occupations  were  most  likely  to  reduce  their 
working hours.  
One concern could be that the retirement choice is partly correlated with the much 
earlier occupational choice. If some individuals chose a specific occupation also for better 
                                                                                                                                                          
their occupation (e.g., teachers). Only 15 percent of respondents say that they deliberately want to work less than 
40 hours per week, and this share has not changed between 2003 and 2007. 22 
 
prospects  of  early  or  late  retirement,  ignoring  the  occupational  choice  my  lead  to  biased 
estimation. The ULMS luckily offers a comprehensive retrospective labor market history until 
the  year  1986,  from  which  we  can  infer  occupational  choices.  When  controlling  for  the 
occupation held in 1986 (which can be considered exogenous to retirement decisions taken 
between 2003 and 2007) the results remain robust (Table 20). Other robustness checks in this 
table  include  the  exclusion  of  individuals  who  live  in  households  that  changed  their 
composition between 2003 and 2007 and the sample split in workers that report to suffer from 
at least one out of seven chronic diseases. Chronically ill women reduce their yearly labor 
supply substantially, while we find little evidence for other adjustments. 
 
 
Retirement incentives across the educational distribution 
The  generous  pension  increase  depicted  in  Figure  1  and  the  high  level  of  benefit 
compression suggest that retirement incentives should be higher for low income earners, who 
gain disproportionally  from the equalizing benefit rate  (also Noel et al., 2006). At closer 
inspection, however, two opposing effects determine the relative retirement incentives. While 
higher income levels are associated with higher marginal cost of giving up additional income 
(implying that high income earners are relatively less likely to retire), they are also associated 
with lower marginal utility of income (implying that high income earners are relatively more 
likely to retire). In total, the effect is theoretically ambiguous. 
Let us consider the retirement decision as a discrete choice at every point in time; the 
economic rationale whether or not to retreat from the labor market depends on the comparison 
of costs and benefits of prospective lifetime income flows under different retirement regimes 
(cp. Belloni and Alessie, 2009). From an actuarial perspective, there exists one (or several) 
optimal point(s) in time at which the income flow will be maximized (cp. Stock and Wise, 
1991). Instead of picking the individual optimal retirement date, the interest here is on a static 
comparison of retirement choices before and after the minimum pension increase. Net present 
values  of  lifetime  income  that  representative  individuals  would  face  upon  reaching  the 
retirement age can be calculated from UHBS data. The lifetime wealth at normal retirement 
age t can be computed as the sum of the social security wealth and the wealth from working 
over the retirement age: 
 
NPV =  ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
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( ) t r
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where an individual can chose to keep on working and earn a yearly income Y in 
addition to the yearly pension benefits B up to the real retirement age R, after which B is the 
sole  source  of  income.  As  the  Ukraine  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  benefit 
compression  and  therefore  an  extremely  low  correlation  between  lifetime  earnings  and 
pension benefits, B can actually be treated as a constant. The probability to survive until 
period s is indicated by π(s).
32 Assume that a person reaching pension age has to decide 
whether to keep on working or to retire immediately. For this decision, the entire lifelong 
wealth accumulation is relevant. To show the incentive structure in the Ukrainian case, two 
scenarios are presented, one in which the individual retires immediately upon reaching the 
retirement age (R=0 and s=t) and one in which the individual works three more years before 
retiring. Table 21 compares the lifetime wealth for three broad educational groups of men and 
women in the respective scenarios and reports the cost attached to immediate retirement. For 
both sexes, the results for 2003 show substantial variation between educational groups with 
better educated individuals incurring higher costs for immediate retirement, up to 37 percent. 
Given the substantial pension compression which can be directly seen when comparing the 
absolute NPVs in the “immediate retirement” rows, this is not surprising.  Looking at the 
wealth levels for 2005, one can observe a general welfare improvement. The overall cost 
pattern remains the same (better educated incurring higher costs), however, the reduction in 
the retirement penalty is disproportionally larger for the lower educational group. The pension 
reform reduces the cost of immediate retirement for a low educated worker by 35 percent, 
while the retirement penalty for better educated falls by only one fifth. 
Figure  7  confirms  that  the  stronger  actuarial  retirement  incentives  translate  into 
stronger retirement responses among the less educated. The downward sloping line links the 
levels  of  treatment  effects  across  the  educational  distribution.  Treatment  effects  of  the 
Cumulative Density Function (CDF) are interaction dummies between levels of education 
(measured in years of schooling) with the treatment indicator. Up to 14 years of schooling, the 
pension increase induced additional retirement, while no impact can be detected for the best 
educated.  Table  22  reports  standard  errors  for  the  estimates  presented  in  the  Figure, 
confirming that there is no statistical retirement effect above 13 years of schooling. The group 
of those with nine years of schooling is small in size, leading to imprecise estimation. 
                                                 
32 To compute the NPV, one has to make assumptions about life expectation at retirement age and about time 
preferences (discount rates δ). Life expectancy values at retirement age are taken from Gora (2008); for the 
discount  rate  three  percent  is  assumed  (as  we  are  comparing  very  narrowly  defined  scenarios  here,  the 
simulations are not very sensitive to the choice of the discount rate). For computational details see the Note of 
Table 21. 24 
 
Additional support comes from the direct investigation of individual monetary gains 
from  the  reform.  Based  on  various  individual  characteristics  it  is  possible  to  predict  the 
potential  pension  benefit  that  each  individual  could  expect  before  and  after  the  reform. 
Comparing  these  two  simulated  pension  values,  one  can  construct  the  potential  pension 
growth that varies with gender, education and region (as a proxy for industry structure). As 
expected  during  pension  compression,  persons  with  higher  pension  entitlement  in  2003 
experienced  below  average  potential  pension  growth—the  correlation  coefficient  between 
actual pension benefits in 2003 and potential pension growth is -0.39. When splitting the 
sample at the median pension growth, it turns out that those individuals that could expect 
higher pension rises indeed show stronger retirement responses (Table 23, columns (1) and 
(2)). Adding the potential pension growth as covariate in the basic DiD framework does not 
change  any  of  the  previous  results,  while  the  coefficient  for  potential  pension  growth  is 
significantly positive (Table 23, columns (3) and (4)). 
 
 
4.  Pension income increase and old-age poverty reduction 
 
The public policy objective of the pension increase was to reduce old-age poverty. 
This said, one has to acknowledge that poverty is a multi-facetted concept in itself and that 
the measurement of poverty is non-trivial. As such, only selected evidence of the poverty-
reducing effect of the minimum pension rise will be presented. The poverty reducing effect 
can be measured straightforward in income terms.
33 When combining all individual yearly 
income  sources  (including  net  labor  income,  state  transfers,  gross  transfers,  interest  and 
dividends from the individual questionnaire), it is possible to determine whether a person 
earned sufficient funds to autonomously surpass an absolute poverty line, which is defined as 
the 2.15 USD poverty line used by the World Bank. Figure 8 shows that prior to the reform 
year, the share of those above the poverty line was generally low, but lower for those in 
retirement age. Among the retirees, poverty  was positively correlated  with age. The right 
panels of the Figure show, first, that the ratio of those below the poverty line had shrunk 
dramatically until 2005. This effect is due to the substantial growth experienced by Ukraine 
during the 2000s. Second, elderly people are by 2005 less likely to be poor when compared to 
the  working  aged.  The  substantial  improvement  of  the  welfare  at  older  ages  has  also 
                                                 
33 Although it might be preferable to measure poverty in terms of consumption, substantial difficulties stem from 
the pooling of household resources and the lack of individual level consumption data (for a comparison of 
income and consumption poverty in Ukraine, see Brück, Danzer et al., forthcoming). 25 
 
eradicated the disadvantaged welfare situation of very old retirees. Table 24 indicates that the 
poverty reduction effect which can be attributed to the minimum pension rise was between 16 
and  23  percentage  points  for  the  pooled  sample,  respectively.  Also  in  relative  terms, 
pensioners advanced with respect to the mean of disposable income in the 45 to 65 year old 
population  by  19  to  24  percent.  The  absolute  and  relative  improvement  of  the  economic 
situation  of  pensioners  confirm  the  graphical  evidence  from  Figure  8.  To  sum  up,  the 
government’s pension increase has significantly improved pensioners’ economic position as 
formulated in the general policy objective of the minimum pension increase. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This  paper  provided  econometric  evidence  that  a  substantial  minimum  pension 
increases like the one implemented in Ukraine in 2004, has the potential to lift pensioners out 
of  poverty.  At  the  same  time,  the  reform  significantly  reduced  the  labor  supply  of  both, 
pension  eligible  men  and  women  after  reaching  retirement  age.  These  labor  supply 
adjustments reflect an increased probability of retirement between 30 and 47 percent. Most 
likely,  those  behavioural  responses  have  reduced  the  pure  welfare  effect  of  the  pension 
increase. 
On the aggregate level, the reduction of the labor force is of non-negligible size. When 
computing induced retirement for the first three post-retirement age cohorts, the workforce 
shrinks by 94,000 men and 158,000 women. The overall effect of the pension increase can be 
expected to amount to roughly 413,000 persons or 2.4 percent of the pre-reform labor force. 
Unlike in industrialized countries the relatively static nature of the Ukrainian labor market 
allowed only modest adjustments of individual labor supply at the intensive margin due to the 
absolute  predominance  of  full-time  contracts  with  inflexible  hours.  Yearly  work  load 
reductions were predominatly realized by women and low educated service sector workers 
through adjustments in yearly working weeks. 
The  natural  experiment  of  the  pension  increase  in  Ukraine  allows  drawing  some 
general conclusions for developing and transition countries. For formerly Socialist countries 
the Ukrainian case is insightful, as they share a common Socialist labor market legacy and 
similarly structured pension systems, including relatively good coverage, low retirement ages 26 
 
as well as low correlation between contributions and benefits.
34 This study provided robust 
evidence in a developing context indicating that 
·  an increase in pension income reduces labor supply at older ages for men and women, 
·  the use of a minimum pension guarantee or a flat pension benefit might install strong 
labor market incentives that will differ for various subgroups of the labour force, 
·  a generous full-coverage pension system is able to achieve welfare objectives (reduce 
old-age poverty), although the success of such a systems has to be contrasted with its 
labor supply effects, fiscal costs and the intergenerational burden. The results from the 
analysis suggest that well-informed public welfare policy should take into consideration 
potential  effects  on  individual  labor  supply.  The  policy  goal  to  combat  poverty  via 
pension  increases  might  become  ineffective  and  fiscally  extremely  costly,  when  the 
pension  aged  withdraw  their  manpower  from  the  labor  market.  As  a  consequence, 
overall  welfare  levels  might  increase  less  than  in  a  static  framework  without  labor 
supply response. 
As argued above, the estimated treatment effects have the interpretation of causal pure 
income effects due to the non-means-tested and non-retirement-tested nature of the Ukrainian 
pension system. As such, a note on the external validity  of the results is warranted. The 
presented estimates and elasticities are in line with the previous literature and thus confirm the 
existence  of  retirement  responses  to  positive  income  shocks  in  a  developing  setting; 
retirement  seems,  in  general,  rather  inelastic.  All  results  are  short-run  responses  to  an 
unanticipated pension increase and differ from unanticipated social security rises in the US 
(Moffitt, 1987) by their sheer magnitude and by institutions that promoted myopia among 
agents.
35 As the analysed pension increase exacerbated the fiscal stress of the pension system 
and as labor force participation is hard to forecast in a highly dynamic environment, it is an 
open question whether the effects of the pension increase will remain significant in the future. 
 
                                                 
34 While most formerly Socialist Middle European countries have already implemented full pension reforms, 
most Eastern European countries are still awaiting the advent of the changes in the pension system. 
35 During the transition process, most state institutions became unreliable in the eyes of the population which 
was so used to full state provision of social services. As such, life-cycle maximizing behavior of the population 
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 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1  




Note: The reported values are in nominal terms in Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH). In September 2004, the Cabinet of 
Ministers decided to raise the legal minimum pension guarantee to the subsistence minimum. Between January 
and  March  2005  the  pension  level  did  not  change  much  (black  line),  but  in  April  2005  the  government 
compensated pensioners ex-post to reach a higher benefit level (dashed line). It was only in April 2005 that the 
government also amended the State Budget Law and implemented the new Pension Law which codified the 
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Note: The superimposed full vertical lines mark the average monthly legal minimum pension for 2003 (left) and 
2005 (right). The monthly legal minimum standard is computed as weighted average about the preceding 12 
months. In 2005, the legal minimum pension rose slightly between January and April, however, pensioners were 
ex-post compensated by the government, so that the nominal pension level was 332 for all months in 2005. The 
dashed vertical line marks the state pension cap which was in place prior to the reform. Pension incomes are 
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Source: ULMS; author’s calculations. 32 
 
Figure 4  
Retirement rates across age and years 
 
 






























































Note: Fitted values are predictions from weighted polynomial regressions (of degree two). The use of other 
polynomials  (cubic,  quartic)  yields  very  similar  results  and  can  be  obtained  from  the  author  upon  request. 



































Note: Retirement is defined as receiving old-age pension benefits and reporting no income-generating activity in 
the reference week. Those in the retirement age directly report that they are not searching for jobs because of 
having reached the retirement age. Income generating activities comprise having dependent employment for at 
least one hour per week with the expectation to be paid (including temporary and casual work), working in a 
family enterprise (even when being unpaid helper) or being self-employed or entrepreneur. Income generating 
activities exclude pure subsistence agriculture. The definition of “income generating activity” differs slightly 
between the 2004 and 2007 wave of the ULMS, however, the definition chosen here guarantees the highest 
possible level of comparability. The labor force basis excludes individuals who are receiving disability pensions 
and  those  who  have  retired  on  early  retirement  schemes  (retirement  for  years  of  service).  Some  very  few 
individuals  report  being  generally  entitled  to  old-age  benefits,  but  having  recently  not  been  paid  benefits 









Retirement rates across survey years 
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Difference-in-Differences in educational CDF; dependent variable: retired  
 
Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 36 
 
Figure 8 
Poverty reducing effect of the pension increase 
 















































































































































































Note: Fitted values are from a quartic polynomial regression to the left and to the right of the cut-off point. 
Estimation performed for ten-year brackets at both tails. Poverty line is an absolute poverty line of 2.15 USD 
according to the World Bank. Personal income is one twelfth of the sum of all yearly income components of a 
person, including labor incomes (including outstanding income and inkind payments), various transfer incomes 
(stipends, four types of pensions, unemployment benefits), interest, dividends, revenues, and other incomes. 





Table 1  
Variable description 
 




Retirement aged**  Dummy = 1 if (i) a women is at least 55 
years of age or (ii) a man is at least 60 
years of age 
Dummy = 1 if (i) a women is at least 55 
years of age or (ii) a man is at least 60 
years of age 
Retired  Dummy = 1 if respondent is not 
working, receives an old age pension 
and considers oneself as pensioner 
Dummy = 1 if respondent is not 
working, not searching for a job because 
of “old-age retirement” and receives an 
old age pension 
Yearly working hours  —  Number of yearly working hours in 
current job computed from ordinary 
weekly working hours and ordinary 
weeks worked per year 
Yearly working weeks  —  Number of ordinary weeks worked per 
year in current job 
Weekly working hours  —  Number of ordinary hours worked per 
week in current job 
Years of schooling  Adjusted years of schooling were 
recalculated from information about 
total years of schooling and the highest 
educational degree ever attained 
Adjusted years of schooling according 
to the scheme in Brück, Danzer, 
Muravyev, Weisshaar (2009)* 
Age  Self-reported age of respondent in years  Age of respondent in years; calculated 
from birth information*  
Married  Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is married 
Dummy =1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is married or 
cohabiting 
Widowed  Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is widowed 
Dummy = 1 if self-reported marital 
status of respondent is widowed 
Tenure  Lifetime work experience in years  Work experience in years 
Health variables  Body-Mass-Index and dummy for 
chronic disease (respondent reports 
disease and negative impact on physical 
activity) 
Dummy =1 if person reports one out of 




Household size  Number of persons sharing a common 
budget and living at the same address 
Number of persons currently sharing a 
common budget and living at the same 
address 
Number of working age 
adults 
Total number of persons in working age 
in household; women 20-54, men 20-59 
Total number of persons in working age 
in household; women 20-54, men 20-59 
Income by the working 
aged 
Sum of all incomes from the working 
aged population between 20 and 45 
years in the household; including labor 
income, gross transfers, dividends and 
capital income, state benefits; calculated 
from individual questionnaires 
Sum of all incomes from the working 
aged population between 20 and 45 
years in the household; including labor 
income, gross transfers, dividends and 
capital income, state benefits; calculated 
from individual questionnaires 
Invalid person in HH  Dummy = 1 if household contains a 
person with invalidity status 
— 
Children up to age 17 in 
HH 
Dummy = 1 if household contains 
children up to age seventeen 
Dummy = 1 if household contains 
children up to age seventeen 
City, Town, Village  Dummies = 1 if respondent lives in 
urban settlement of big size, smaller size 
Dummies = 1 if respondent lives in 
urban settlement from 100,000 38 
 
or in rural settlement  inhabitants, settlement up to 99,999 
inhabitants or rural settlement 
Oblast  Dummies for oblasts (26 regions)  Dummies for oblasts (26 regions) 
Interview year  Dummies for all interview years 2002-
2006. Interviews were taken in 
December. 
Dummies for all interview years 2003, 
2004, 2007. Interviews were 





   
Regional share of 
employment in mining 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in the mining sector, 
computed for 78 regional clusters  
— 
Regional share of 
employment in 
agriculture 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in agriculture, computed for 
78 regional clusters 
— 
Regional share of 
employment in state 
sector 
Share of regional employment of the 
workforce in the state sector, computed 
for 78 regional clusters 
— 
Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate, computed for 78 
regional clusters 
— 
Note: * These variables were cleaned to generate consistency across panel waves. ** For further robustness a 
variable was created that additionally requires a minimum of twenty years of work experience for women and 
twenty five years of work experience for men. 39 
 
Table 2  
Means of retirement rates—by age group and reform exposure; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
Experiment of Interest: Reform year 2004, retirement age at 60 (men) and 55 (women)    
Panel A. Men  2002-2003  2005  Panel B. Women  2002-2003  2005    
   Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
Age 58-59  0.215  0.166  -0.049  Age 53-54  0.111  0.078  -0.034 
   (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Age 61-62  0.689  0.816  0.127  Age 56-57  0.552  0.651  0.099 
   (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
Difference  0.474  0.649  0.176  Difference  0.440  0.573  0.133 
N=1097  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.059)  N=1845  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.041) 
     
Control experiment 1: Artificial retirement age at 58 (men) and 53 (women)    
Panel A. Men  2002-2003  2005  Panel B. Women  2002-2003  2005    
   Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
Age 57  0.171  0.159  -0.012  Age 52  0.078  0.062  -0.016 
   (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.051)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.027) 
Age 58-59  0.215  0.166  -0.049  Age 53-54  0.111  0.078  -0.034 
   (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Difference  0.044  0.008  -0.037  Difference  0.033  0.015  -0.018 
N=685  (0.044)  (0.049)  (0.066)  N=1334  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.034) 
     
Control experiment 2: Artifical reform between 2002 and 2003    
Panel A. Men  2002  2003  Panel B. Women  2002  2003    
   Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Difference 
Age 58-59  0.163  0.266  0.103  Age 53-54  0.129  0.094  -0.034 
   (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.028) 
Age 61-62  0.692  0.685  -0.006  Age 56-57  0.536  0.564  0.028 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.045)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.047) 
Difference  0.529  0.420  -0.110  Difference  0.408  0.470  0.062 
N=757  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.070)  N=1106  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.055) 
Note: Reported values are retirement rates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 40 
 
 
Table 3  
Difference-in-Differences—stepwise inclusion of covariates; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
 
Men, aged 58/59 vs. 61/62 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
 
Experiment of interest: Treatment effect of minimum pension increase in September 2004 
Treatment effect  0.176***  0.158***  0.147**  0.143**  0.149***  0.151*** 
  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Constant  0.215***  0.159**  -62.581*  -60.321*  -61.042*  -60.959* 
  (0.027)  (0.076)  (32.042)  (31.928)  (31.779)  (31.726) 
Observations  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097 
R-squared  0.272  0.326  0.368  0.373  0.382  0.384 
 
Control experiment: Treatment assumed in 2003 
Treatment effect  -0.110  -0.099  -0.062  -0.061  -0.049  -0.046 
  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Constant  0.163***  0.116  -42.685  -41.951  -40.141  -40.293 
  (0.032)  (0.095)  (40.276)  (40.346)  (40.609)  (40.924) 
Observations  757  757  757  757  757  757 
R-squared  0.210  0.288  0.333  0.336  0.342  0.347 
 
 
Women, aged 53/54 vs. 56/57 
 
Experiment of interest: Treatment effect of minimum pension increase in September 2004 
Treatment effect  0.133***  0.126***  0.105***  0.105***  0.107***  0.110*** 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
Constant  0.111***  0.065  27.528  27.445  28.098  25.555 
  (0.015)  (0.059)  (18.653)  (18.677)  (18.669)  (18.556) 
Observations  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845 
R-squared  0.271  0.326  0.380  0.380  0.381  0.385 
             
Control experiment: Treatment assumed in 2003 
Treatment effect  0.062  0.080  0.085  0.085  0.084  0.077 
  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.052) 
Constant  0.129***  0.038  18.133  18.132  18.964  17.135 
  (0.022)  (0.071)  (25.331)  (25.354)  (25.392)  (25.059) 
Observations  1106  1106  1106  1106  1106  1106 
R-squared  0.221  0.290  0.347  0.347  0.348  0.355 
             
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X  X 
Individuals controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Industry structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations.41 
 
 
Table 4  













Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Difference  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Difference  s.e. 
Retired  0.334  (0.014)  0.409  (0.018)  0.075  (0.023)  0.100  (0.010)  0.607  (0.016)  0.506  (0.019) 
Age  54.94  (0.047)  55.19  (0.056)  0.243  (0.073)  53.52  (0.017)  56.44  (0.016)  2.922  (0.023) 
Married  0.655  (0.014)  0.654  (0.018)  -0.001  (0.023)  0.670  (0.016)  0.639  (0.016)  -0.031  (0.022) 
Widowed  0.149  (0.011)  0.172  (0.014)  0.023  (0.018)  0.130  (0.011)  0.185  (0.013)  0.055  (0.017) 
Years worked  31.52  (0.154)  31.10  (0.172)  -0.428  (0.235)  30.29  (0.152)  32.33  (0.165)  2.038  (0.226) 
Years of schooling  11.79  (0.080)  12.00  (0.088)  0.208  (0.121)  11.99  (0.081)  11.77  (0.087)  -0.214  (0.119) 
At least 12 yrs of schooling  0.495  (0.015)  0.574  (0.018)  0.079  (0.024)  0.541  (0.017)  0.513  (0.016)  -0.028  (0.023) 
At least 14 yrs of schooling  0.233  (0.013)  0.222  (0.015)  -0.011  (0.020)  0.221  (0.014)  0.236  (0.014)  0.014  (0.020) 
Household size  2.591  (0.038)  2.620  (0.047)  0.028  (0.061)  2.649  (0.042)  2.560  (0.041)  -0.089  (0.059) 
Children up to 17 in household  0.213  (0.012)  0.218  (0.015)  0.004  (0.020)  0.217  (0.014)  0.214  (0.013)  -0.003  (0.019) 
Person with invalidity status in household  0.056  (0.007)  0.074  (0.010)  0.018  (0.012)  0.070  (0.009)  0.057  (0.008)  -0.013  (0.011) 
Total income of other household members  945.58  (64.63)  1574.04  (123.54)  628.46  (128.25)  1318.75  (98.83)  1085.10  (80.27)  -233.66  (126.48) 
Body Mass Index  27.48  (0.129)  27.60  (0.148)  0.118  (0.199)  27.37  (0.141)  27.68  (0.134)  0.313  (0.195) 
Reduced physical activity  0.362  (0.016)  0.307  (0.019)  -0.054  (0.025)  0.317  (0.018)  0.361  (0.017)  0.044  (0.025) 
Chronic disease  0.061  (0.007)  0.055  (0.008)  -0.006  (0.011)  0.051  (0.007)  0.067  (0.008)  0.016  (0.011) 
Medical treatment  0.099  (0.009)  0.106  (0.011)  0.007  (0.014)  0.095  (0.010)  0.108  (0.010)  0.012  (0.014) 
Regular physical activity (sport)  0.129  (0.010)  0.111  (0.012)  -0.018  (0.016)  0.117  (0.011)  0.126  (0.011)  0.009  (0.015) 
Village  0.289  (0.014)  0.348  (0.018)  0.058  (0.022)  0.292  (0.015)  0.332  (0.015)  0.039  (0.022) 
Town   0.296  (0.014)  0.268  (0.016)  -0.028  (0.021)  0.283  (0.015)  0.286  (0.015)  0.002  (0.021) 
City  0.415  (0.015)  0.384  (0.018)  -0.031  (0.023)  0.424  (0.017)  0.383  (0.016)  -0.042  (0.023) 
Region  39.30  (0.732)  40.48  (0.864)  1.176  (1.141)  40.31  (0.801)  39.28  (0.780)  -1.036  (0.559) 42 
 
Mean comparison—prior and after reform, control and treatment group (cont.) 
 
                Men 
 







Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Difference  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e.  Difference  s.e. 
Retired  0.542  (0.018)  0.497  (0.027)  -0.045  (0.033)  0.200  (0.019)  0.735  (0.017)  0.535  (0.026) 
Age  60.49  (0.055)  60.01  (0.085)  -0.483  (0.100)  58.49  (0.024)  61.51  (0.019)  3.020  (0.031) 
Married  0.906  (0.011)  0.924  (0.014)  0.017  (0.019)  0.913  (0.014)  0.911  (0.011)  -0.002  (0.018) 
Widowed  0.048  (0.008)  0.035  (0.010)  -0.012  (0.013)  0.033  (0.009)  0.051  (0.008)  0.018  (0.013) 
Years worked  36.77  (0.202)  35.46  (0.321)  -1.304  (0.370)  34.40  (0.281)  37.61  (0.204)  3.207  (0.340) 
Years of schooling  11.11  (0.122)  11.79  (0.150)  0.680  (0.208)  11.94  (0.146)  10.92  (0.125)  -1.020  (0.196) 
At least 12 yrs of schooling  0.390  (0.018)  0.488  (0.027)  0.099  (0.032)  0.504  (0.024)  0.368  (0.019)  -0.136  (0.030) 
At least 14 yrs of schooling  0.221  (0.015)  0.247  (0.023)  0.026  (0.027)  0.264  (0.021)  0.207  (0.016)  -0.057  (0.026) 
Household size  2.707  (0.044)  2.621  (0.062)  -0.086  (0.078)  2.732  (0.058)  2.647  (0.046)  -0.084  (0.074) 
Children up to 17 in household  0.202  (0.015)  0.165  (0.020)  -0.037  (0.026)  0.198  (0.019)  0.186  (0.015)  -0.012  (0.024) 
Person with invalidity status in household  0.045  (0.008)  0.041  (0.011)  -0.004  (0.013)  0.054  (0.011)  0.037  (0.007)  -0.017  (0.013) 
Total income of other household members  668.56  (59.17)  1150.49  (159.03)  481.93  (138.37)  846.07  (109.70)  800.14  (78.86)  -45.93  (132.07) 
Body Mass Index  26.16  (0.121)  26.47  (0.180)  0.315  (0.217)  26.14  (0.158)  26.33  (0.130)  0.192  (0.206) 
Reduced physical activity  0.378  (0.021)  0.400  (0.032)  0.022  (0.038)  0.363  (0.029)  0.398  (0.022)  0.035  (0.036) 
Chronic disease  0.069  (0.009)  0.074  (0.014)  0.005  (0.017)  0.049  (0.011)  0.083  (0.011)  0.034  (0.016) 
Medical treatment  0.116  (0.012)  0.103  (0.017)  -0.013  (0.021)  0.097  (0.014)  0.122  (0.013)  0.025  (0.020) 
Regular physical activity (sport)  0.153  (0.013)  0.188  (0.021)  0.035  (0.024)  0.184  (0.019)  0.152  (0.014)  -0.032  (0.023) 
Village  0.383  (0.018)  0.388  (0.026)  0.005  (0.032)  0.374  (0.024)  0.391  (0.019)  0.017  (0.030) 
Town   0.279  (0.016)  0.285  (0.025)  0.007  (0.029)  0.266  (0.021)  0.290  (0.018)  0.024  (0.028) 
City  0.338  (0.017)  0.326  (0.025)  -0.012  (0.031)  0.360  (0.023)  0.318  (0.018)  -0.042  (0.029) 
Region  40.17  (0.859)  39.63  (1.316)  -0.537  (1.556)  40.36  (1.152)  39.77  (0.921)  -0.592  (1.477) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 
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Table 5  
Differential treatment across subgroups; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
(8)  (9) 







Urban  Rural 
                   
Treatment effect  0.176***  0.133***  0.144***  0.078    0.120**  0.182***  0.153***  0.105** 
  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.174)    (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.050) 
Retirement age  0.474***  0.440***  0.450***  0.490***    0.412***  0.495***  0.376***  0.621*** 
  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.085)    (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.034) 
Post-reform  -0.049  -0.034  -0.045**  0.141  0.407  0.000  -0.098***  -0.039  -0.045 
  (0.042)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.149)  (0.075)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.038) 
Min service years 
(MSY) 
        0.429*** 
(0.047) 
       
MSY*post-reform          -0.183**         
          (0.075)         
Chronic          0.127 
(0.139) 
       
MSY*Chronic          -0.097 
(0.142) 
       
MSY*Post-
reform*Chronic 
        0.189*** 
(0.073) 
       
Constant  0.215***  0.111***  0.223***  0.322***  1.273***  0.212***  0.249***  0.233***  0.207*** 
  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.081)  (0.115)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.030) 
Observations  1097  1845  2781  161  4416  1501  1441  1943  999 
R-squared  0.272  0.271  0.282  0.389  0.290  0.266  0.322  0.236  0.433 
F test              16.4  3.0                                  18.5                         37.8 
Note:Linear probability models with dependent variable: retired. F test for hypothesis that coefficients are significantly different for two comparison groups in (1), 
(2) and (4). Regression (3) is a pooled regression containing interactions between Minimum Service Years (20 for women, 25 for men), post-reform period and 
chronic. Sample is extended to five pre-retirement years during which the majority of early retirement takes place. Regression controls for full set of controls 
including year of birth dummies (see Table 4). Critical F-value for 2942 observations is 2.37. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: UHBS; author’s calculations 44 
 
Table 6  
Robustness checks; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Men  Women    Men  Men  Women  Women 
 
   
—excluding mining area 
   
—controlling for shadow wage 
               
Treatment effect  0.158***  0.127***    0.152***  0.143***  0.123***  0.110*** 
  (0.061)  (0.042)    (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.040)  (0.038) 
Retirement age  0.473***  0.444***    0.457***  0.216**  0.428***  0.297*** 
  (0.036)  (0.029)    (0.035)  (0.088)  (0.027)  (0.062) 
Post-reform   -0.040  -0.038*    0.067  0.104  0.063**  -0.037 
  (0.043)  (0.022)    (0.047)  (0.074)  (0.025)  (0.056) 
Shadow wage (yearly earnings)        -0.069***  -0.081*  -0.067***  0.003 
        (0.013)  (0.044)  (0.009)  (0.037) 
Constant   0.210***  0.117***    0.339***  -59.096*  0.198***  25.547 
  (0.027)  (0.015)    (0.036)  (31.621)  (0.019)  (18.562) 
Full controls  —   —     —  X  —  X 
Observations  1050  1748    1097  1097  1845  1845 
R-squared  0.266  0.270    0.297  0.386  0.296  0.385 
Note:Linear  probability  models  with  dependent  variable:  retired.  Columns  (1)  and  (2):  Mining  areas  are  regions  in  which  more  than  20  percent  of  regional 
employment is concentrated in the mining sector (3 out of 78). Columns (3)-(6): Shadow wage caluclated as potential yearly earnings in gender-age-education-region 
cell, correcting for labor force particpation. These cells contain predictions from a Heckit models which accounts for selection into the working state by exploiting 
pension age as an exclusion restriction. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations 45 
 
Table 7 
Impact of pension increase on household composition; UHBS data  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
  Pooled   Men   Women 
 
  Dependent variable 
 


















             
Treatment effect  -0.062  0.050  0.070  0.085  -0.149  0.008 
  (0.077)  (0.062)  (0.105)  (0.086)  (0.096)  (0.078) 
Retirement age  0.039  -0.968***  0.177  -0.983***  0.135  -1.048*** 
  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.151)  (0.130)  (0.151)  (0.120) 
Post-reform  0.070  0.016  -0.088  -0.162**  0.147**  0.098* 
  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.080)  (0.069)  (0.072)  (0.056) 
Constant  5.405  7.343  46.591  -42.617  38.226  9.454 
  (7.620)  (6.142)  (57.212)  (51.532)  (46.920)  (37.915) 
Observations  2942  2942  1097  1097  1845  1845 
R-squared  0.587  0.558  0.626  0.573  0.572  0.548 
Note: Linear regressions controlling for region and place of settlement, age, marital status, education, work experience, 
chronic disease, presence of children up to 17 in household, presence of person with invalidity status in household, 
regional industry structure (share of employment in mining, agriculture, state enterprises as well as unemployment rate). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 46 
 
Table 8 
Labor supply effect of pension increase; dependent variable: retired; ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 










         
Treatment effect  0.146**  0.223**  0.150***  0.139*** 
  (0.0573)  (0.104)  (0.045)  (0.041) 
Retirement age  0.337***  0.355***  0.344***  0.332*** 
  (0.041)  (0.049)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Post-reform  0.059  0.023  0.045  0.041 
  (0.0456)  (0.060)  (0.036)  (0.033) 
Constant  0.137  0.199  0.156  0.150 
  (0.433)  (0.477)  (0.323)  (0.281) 
Observations  713  365  1078  1339 
R-squared  0.171  0.159  0.156  0.168 
Note: Regressions control for age dummies, marital status, education, chronic diseases, household size, presence of 
children in household, income generated by other household members, region of settlement. (3) and (4) include a gender 
dummy. Age brackets +/- 3 age cohorts around retirement age with year of retirement age excluded. Retirement aged 
reflects retirement eligibility. Column (1) to (3) exclude households which changed composition between 2004 and 
2007. Robust standard errors clustered by household size in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: 
ULMS 2003, 2004, 2007; author’s calculations. 47 
 
Table 9  
Retirement and eligibility of couples; UHBS data 
Age of Husband 
Age of Wive  50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
50-54  2003  7.4%  16.7%  59.6%  a  a 
2005  9.6%  13.0%  50.0%  73.7%  a 
 
sig.  *  **  * 
    55-59  2003  41.0%  46.6%  76.5%  88.5%  a 




**  **       
60-64  2003  a  82.6%  88.9%  93.8%  100% 
2005  a  81.3%  89.2%  92.9%  100% 
 
sig. 
   
        
65-69  2003  a  a  92.1%  95.6%  97.6% 
2005  a  a  96.2%  96.6%  95.3% 
 
sig. 
   
*     * 
70-74  2003  a  a  a  97.1%  99.1% 
2005  a  a  a  100%  100% 
 
sig. 
   
   *    
Note: a. Less than 40 observations in cell. Cells report share of couples with at least one partner retired. Framed 
numbers contain between 30 and 40 observations only. Shaded area marks retirement eligibility of at least one 
partner. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS 2003 and 2005; author’s caluclations.  
 
Table 10  
Share of jointly retired couples; UHBS data 
Age of Husband 
Age of Wive  50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
50-54  2003  14.3%  17.6%  9.7%  a  a 
 
2005  10.3%  12.9%  5.9%  a  a 
sig. 
55-59  2003  0.0%  16.2%  53.8%  72.2%  a 
2005  4.8%  11.4%  65.6%  75.0%  a 
sig.  *  ***       
60-64  2003  a  21.1%  75.0%  76.4%  83.0% 
2005  a  11.5%  77.4%  79.8%  81.5% 
 
sig.          
65-69  2003  a  a  75.9%  77.7%  88.4% 
2005  a  a  76.5%  83.2%  88.8% 
 
sig.     **    
70-74  2003  a  a  a  93.9%  91.8% 
2005  a  a  a  88.6%  93.8% 
 
sig.          
Note: a. Less than 40 observations in cell. Cells report share of jointly retired couples in all couples with at least 
one partner retired. Framed numbers contain between 30 and 40 observations only. Shaded area marks age of joint 
normal retirement age. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS 2003 and 2005; author’s caluclations.  48 
 
Table 11  
Difference-in-Differences of retirement—choice of comparison bandwidth; dependent variable: retired; 
UHBS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
   
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.223***  0.176***  0.146***  0.118***  0.105*** 
  (0.086)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.031) 
Constant  0.297***  0.215***  0.199***  0.184***  0.166*** 
  (0.044)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
Observations  538  1097  1729  2472  3226 
R-squared  0.194  0.272  0.311  0.340  0.381 
 
  Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.101*  0.133***  0.091***  0.077***  0.057** 
  (0.057)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Constant  0.124***  0.111***  0.099***  0.084***  0.073*** 
  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Observations  996  1845  2675  3555  4398 
R-squared  0.216  0.271  0.318  0.372  0.414 





Table 12  
Retirement rates across survey years 
Men  Women 
Age groups  58/59  61/62  53/54  56/57 
2002  0.187  0.692  0.129  0.536 
2003  0.213  0.687  0.094  0.564 
(0.63)  -(0.12)  -(1.18)  (0.59) 
2004  0.203  0.715  0.100  0.633 
(0.40)  (0.46)  -(0.97)  (2.13) 
2005  0.163  0.816  0.090  0.652 
 
-(0.62)  (2.68)  -(1.41)  (2.72) 
2006  0.198  0.804  0.110  0.659 
(0.30)  (2.39)  -(0.62)  (2.90) 
Note: Report values are retirement rates. T-statistics in parentheses for a test of the hypothesis that year coefficients 









Instrumental variable estimation of the effect of pension receipt on retirement; dependent variable: not working; UHBS data 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
 
                 Full sample    Men          Women                    
 
  OLS  IV  First stage    OLS  IV  First stage    OLS  IV  First stage 
                       
Pension Receiver  0.359***  0.427***      0.412***  0.644***      0.363***  0.439**   
  (0.020)  (0.041)      (0.031)  (0.073)      (0.038)  (0.176)   
Pension eligible*post-reform      0.679***        0.665***        0.223*** 
      (0.024)        (0.046)        (0.026) 
Constant  -0.749***  -0.488*  -2.976***    1.319***  1.297***  0.253    -1.039  0.000  -12.30*** 
  (0.225)  (0.266)  (0.179)    (0.200)  (0.200)  (0.189)    (0.661)  (2.443)  (0.307) 
Observations  2942  2942  2942    1097  1097  1097    1845  1845  1845 
F-stat      77.9        209.9        71.5 
R-squared 
Partial R-squared 
0.325  0.321   
0.212 
  0.314  0.274   
0.166 
  0.338  0.336   
0.038 
Note:  Dependent  variable:  retired.  All  regressions  control  for  full  set  of  controls  (see  Table  4).  Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 
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Table 14  
Difference-in-Regression-Discontinuity estimation; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
       
Men  
     
Treatment effect  0.188***  0.187***  0.176***  0.176***  0.174***  0.175*** 
  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Norm. age  0.058***  0.060***  0.068***  0.067***  0.066***  0.066*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Norm. age squ.  0.003*  0.003**  0.003**  0.003**  0.003**  0.003** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Retirement age  0.315***  0.309***  0.315***  0.315***  0.319***  0.317*** 
  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
Norm. age*retirement age  -0.013  -0.018  -0.026  -0.026  -0.025  -0.024 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Norm. age squ.*retirement age  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Post-reform  -0.054  -0.063  -0.058  -0.058  -0.056  -0.056 
  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
Norm. age*post-reform  -0.006  -0.010  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Norm. age squ.*post-reform  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  0.323***  0.248***  0.786***  0.782***  0.803***  0.639*** 
  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.095) 
Observations  4690  4690  4690  4690  4690  4690 
R-squared  0.571  0.585  0.601  0.602  0.603  0.604 
      Women       
Treatment effect  0.103**  0.097**  0.088**  0.088**  0.086**  0.086** 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Norm. age  0.029***  0.026***  0.034***  0.034***  0.033***  0.033*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Norm. age squ.  0.002***  0.001***  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Retirement age  0.336***  0.344***  0.348***  0.348***  0.350***  0.351*** 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Norm. age*retirement age  0.051***  0.050***  0.048***  0.048***  0.048***  0.048*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Norm. age squ.*retirement age  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Post reform  -0.024  -0.019  -0.018  -0.017  -0.016  -0.015 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Norm. age*post-reform  -0.007**  -0.006**  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Norm. age squ.*post-reform  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.138***  0.085***  0.603***  0.602***  0.617***  0.502*** 
  (0.022)  (0.031)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.069) 
Observations  6762  6762  6762  6762  6762  6762 
R-squared  0.618  0.634  0.653  0.653  0.653  0.653 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Industry structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations 51 
 
Table 15 
Means of labor supply—by age group and reform exposure 
  Men  2003-2004  2007  Women 2003-2004  2007  Least educated 2003-2004  2007 
 
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
   
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
   
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Age 58-59  2086.042  2074.018  -12.024 
 
Age 53-54  1626.93  1649.87  22.94 
 
Age 53-54  1360.62  1333.55  -27.07 
 
(95.825)  (105.697)  (45.359) 
   
(251.89)  (257.89)  (55.53) 
   
(415.32)  (435.30)  (112.82) 
Age 61-62  1879.790  1982.177  102.387 
 
Age 56-57  1834.58  1577.06  -257.52 
 
Age 56-57  1414.11  926.99  -487.12 
 
(42.254)  (66.339)  (64.604) 
   
(249.30)  (245.93)  (66.23) 
   
(337.84)  (371.09)  (163.56) 
Difference  -206.252  -91.841  114.411 
 
Difference  207.65  -72.81  -280.46 
 
Difference  53.50  -406.55  -460.05 
N=902  (90.912)  (100.655)  (80.650) 
 
N=976  (74.08)  (86.59)  (86.01) 
 
N=211  (181.84)  (244.94)  (200.69) 
                         Panel B: Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Age 58-59  48.856  49.541  0.685 
 
Age 53-54  45.636  46.695  1.059 
 
Age 53-54  38.888  40.525  1.636 
 
(1.109)  (1.208)  (0.484) 
   
(1.362)  (1.445)  (55.528) 
   
(4.854)  (4.755)  (1.332) 
Age 61-62  48.180  49.374  1.194 
 
Age 56-57  47.855  45.259  -2.595 
 
Age 56-57  42.328  36.552  -5.776 
 
(0.539)  (1.127)  (1.207) 
   
(1.014)  (1.289)  (0.791) 
   
(3.769)  (4.289)  (2.107) 
Difference  -0.677  -0.167  0.510 
 
Difference  2.218  -1.436  -3.655 
 
Difference  3.440  -3.973  -7.413 
N=902  (1.163)  (0.713)  (1.299) 
 
N=976  (0.892)  (0.915)  (0.917) 
 
N=211  (2.509)  (2.458)  (2.564) 
                         Panel C: Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Age 58-59  42.126  40.834  -1.292 
 
Age 53-54  34.232  33.356  -0.876 
 
Age 53-54  32.918  29.138  -3.780 
 
(1.968)  (2.114)  (0.789) 
   
(4.737)  (4.858)  (1.099) 
   
(7.728)  (8.235)  (2.357) 
Age 61-62  39.258  39.262  0.004 
 
Age 56-57  36.966  33.162  -3.804 
 
Age 56-57  31.418  23.327  -8.091 
 
(1.077)  (1.408)  (1.212) 
   
(4.716)  (4.655)  (1.275) 
   
(6.246)  (6.634)  (3.114) 
Difference  -2.868  -1.572  1.295 
 
Difference  2.734  -0.195  -2.929 
 
Difference  -1.500  -5.811  -4.311 
N=902  (1.763)  (1.891)  (1.443) 
 
N=976  (1.315)  (1.563)  (1.671) 
 
N=211  (3.388)  (4.902)  (3.870) 
Source: ULMS; author’s calculations.52 
 
  
Table 16  
Difference-in-Differences of yearly working hours; ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   
Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
 




       
Treatment effect  -94.952  114.412  -280.456***  -460.051** 
  (59.628)  (80.650)  (86.011)  (200.687) 
Constant  1,722.589***  2,086.042***  1,626.933***  1,360.617*** 
  (122.949)  (95.825)  (251.895)  (415.323) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.178  0.169  0.109  0.041 
Observations  1877  902  976  211 
Number of truncated observations  2794  999  1795  872 
 
Full controls 
       
Treatment effect  -119.986**  50.900  -281.119***  -449.022** 
  (60.884)  (81.482)  (84.860)  (226.291) 
Constant  1,924.744*  2,799.480**  917.383  1,868.485 
  (1,084.404)  (1,374.398)  (798.138)  (1,802.273) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.049  0.058  0. 045  0.061 
Observations  1740  833  906  192 
Number of truncated observations  2623  941  1682  815 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no controls include a gender dummy and 
year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, 
widowed, single or seperated), a dummy for one out of seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total 






Labor supply responses at intensive margin, women sample; ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Treatment effect  -297.641***  -300.563***  -288.328***  -277.110***  -281.119*** 
  (87.881)  (85.657)  (85.154)  (84.665)  (84.860) 
Constant  1,999.642***  1,929.807***  873.583  894.096  917.383 
  (195.489)  (209.033)  (774.364)  (782.222)  (798.138) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.014  0.024  0.039  0.044  0.045 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Treatment effect  -3.577***  -3.566***  -3.419***  -3.400***  -3.264*** 
  (0.986)  (0.960)  (0.938)  (0.930)  (0.935) 
Constant  45.740***  45.910***  25.524***  27.407***  28.150*** 
  (1.174)  (1.535)  (6.911)  (6.981)  (6.749) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.007  0.010  0.016  0.015  0.018 
           
Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Treatment effect  -3.013*  -2.961*  -2.870*  -2.678*  -2.722* 
  (1.664)  (1.641)  (1.615)  (1.614)  (1.602) 
Constant  36.989***  44.196***  41.375*  37.876*  41.923** 
  (2.970)  (4.330)  (21.344)  (21.101)  (20.752) 
Observations  906  906  906  906  906 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.010  0.027  0.035  0.029  0.043 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no controls include year of birth fixed 
effects. Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or 
seperated), a dummy for one out of seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total income of other 




Labor supply responses at intensive margin, least educated sample; ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working hours 
Treatment effect  -363.348*  -381.060*  -375.622*  -361.343*  -449.022** 
  (204.588)  (198.540)  (196.327)  (196.616)  (226.291) 
Constant  1,257.841***  1,010.884**  2,317.049  2,364.564  1,868.485 
  (463.954)  (464.929)  (1,652.760)  (1,695.076)  (1,802.273) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.056  0.036  0.065  0.068  0.061 
           
Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
Treatment effect  -7.324**  -8.356**  -8.313**  -8.339**  -6.934** 
  (2.934)  (3.397)  (3.492)  (3.664)  (2.851) 
Constant  42.503***  49.107***  59.892***  59.858***  58.697*** 
  (6.735)  (1.814)  (22.748)  (22.608)  (22.005) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.006  0.004  0.018  0.017  0.013 
           
Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
Treatment effect  -2.044  -2.499  -2.258  -2.403  -3.454 
  (3.257)  (3.308)  (3.513)  (3.478)  (4.240) 
Constant  40.987***  60.344***  -1.230  -1.421  5.665 
  (7.354)  (12.363)  (29.430)  (29.065)  (29.426) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.008  0.012  0.033  0.033  0.032 
Region & Place FE  —  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no controls include 
a gender dummy and year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, years 
of schooling, marital status (married, widowed, single or seperated), a dummy for one out of seven chronic diseases, 
children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total income of other household members. Educational 
category 1 means primary and unfinished education. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by id; *** p<0.01, 




Robustness checks for labor supply responses at intensive margin; dependent variable: yearly working hours; 
ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
  Full sample    Sub sample of (1) 
 
  Baseline  Random 
effects 









               
               
Women 
Treatment effect  -265.72***  -228.82***    -260.28***  36.36  -354.37***  -244.11*** 
  (84.09)  (77.01)    (89.84)  (179.83)  (88.97)  (91.26) 
Constant  1,267.32      1,536.88  2,315.83*  225.90  954.49 
  (942.77)      (1,055.27)  (1,395.24)  (1,160.70)  (1,064.69) 
Observations  906  906    832  249  657  713 
 
R-squared 
0.003   
0.132 
  0.000  0.000  0.018  0.013 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
   
0.18 
         
               
Least educated 
Treatment effect  -449.02**  -459.74*    -375.52  -831.15*  -201.13  -457.54** 
  (226.29)  (256.26)    (259.69)  (424.97)  (225.67)  (221.71) 
Constant  1,868.49      1,523.65  -7,446.11***  1,401.72  3,340.97* 
  (1,802.27)      (1,493.43)  (2,782.26)  (2,422.28)  (1,744.56) 
Observations  192  192    173  60  132  156 
 
R-squared 
0.061   
0.282 
  0.046  0.021  0.054  0.076 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
   
0.99 
         
Note:  All  regressions  include  full  set  of  controls  (see  Table  13).  Regressions  (1)  and  (3)-(6)  are  truncated  linear 
regressions. Standard error clustered by id. Regression (2) is a random effects panel regression. The Hausman statistics 
test the null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in coefficients from random effects vs. fixed effects 
model (the latter not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source ULMS; author’s calculations. 56 
 
 
Table 20  
Difference-in-Differences of working weeks and weekly working hours; ULMS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   
Dependent variable: Yearly working weeks 
 
   
Dependent variable: Weekly working hours 
  Full sample  Men  Women  Educational 
category 1 
  Full sample  Men  Women  Educational 
category 1 
                   
No Controls                   
Treatment effect  -1.619**  0.510  -3.655***  -7.413***    -0.853  1.295  -2.929*  -4.311 
  (0.703)  (1.300)  (0.917)  (2.564)    (1.117)  (1.443)  (1.671)  (3.870) 
Constant  47.671***  48.856***  45.636***  38.888***    41.963***  42.126***  34.232***  32.918*** 
  (1.209)  (1.190)  (1.023)  (4.854)    (0.416)  (1.968)  (4.737)  (7.728) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.021  0.009  0.022  0.011    0.019  0.017  0.017  0.014 
Observations  1877  902  976  211    1877  902  976  211 
Truncated observations  2794  999  1795  872    2794  999  1795  872 
 
Full controls 
                 
Treatment effect  -1.655**  0.081  -3.264***  -6.934**    -1.014  1.175  -2.722*  -3.451 
  (0.707)  (1.330)  (0.935)  (2.851)    (1.068)  (1.450)  (1.602)  (4.240) 
Constant  46.742***  77.838***  28.150***  58.697***    46.582*  63.268**  41.923*  5.665 
  (16.407)  (23.890)  (6.749)  (22.005)    (26.562)  (29.965)  (20.752)  (29.426) 
Goodness of fit (ρ²)  0.027  0.009  0.018  0.013    0.063  0.032  0.043  0.032 
Observations  1740  833  906  192    1740  833  906  192 
Truncated observations  2623  941  1682  815    2623  941  1682  815 
Note: Table reports estimates from a truncated linear regression, truncation at zero. Regressions with no controls include a gender dummy and 
year of birth fixed effects. Full controls include region and settlement type fixed effects, age, years of schooling, marital status (married, 
widowed, single or seperated), a dummy for one out of seven chronic diseases, children up to age 17 present in household, household size, total 
income of other household members. Educational category 1 means primary and unfinished education. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 




Table 21  







2003  %  2005  %  Difference 
Men (life expectancy at retirement 14 years) 
Lower education  Working 3 more years        6,286  
 
      10,547             
 
 
Immediate retirement        4,312   31.4%          8,394   20.4%  -35.0% 
 
  
          Completed secondary education  Working 3 more years        6,410  
 
      11,398             
 
 
Immediate retirement        4,319   32.6%          8,451   25.9%  -20.8% 
 
  
          Higher education  Working 3 more years        6,836  
 
      12,560             
 
 
Immediate retirement        4,320   36.8%          8,871   29.4%  -20.2% 
Women (life expectancy at retirement 25 years) 
Lower education  Working 3 more years        7,601  
 
      14,429  
   
 
Immediate retirement        6,221   18.2%        12,730   11.8%  -35.2% 
 
  
          Completed secondary education  Working 3 more years        8,092  
 
      14,892  
   
 
Immediate retirement        6,647   17.9%        12,753   14.4%  -19.6% 
 
  
          Higher education  Working 3 more years        8,649  
 
      15,911  
   
 
Immediate retirement        6,647   23.1%        12,982   18.4%  -20.5% 
Notes: Total compensation is calculated assuming a constant interest rate of 3%, constant across gender and educational level. 
Life expectancy at retirement varies with gender but is assumed constant across educational levels. Potential earnings are computed as median 
value for married individuals residing in non-rural areas. Yearly retirement benefits are computed at the median of educational groups and are 
assumed constant over time. Some government sources mentioned that pensions were indexed to inflation plus a further amount of not less than 
20 percent in the increase in the national average wage, however, as the implementation of indexation remained unclear at that time we assume 
constant  values.  In  reality,  the  indexation  includes  20  percent  of  real  wage  growth  since  March  2005.  Values  report  discounted  total 
compensation until death in 2002 USD PPP. Life expectancy at retirement age is taken from Gora (2008). 
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Table 22  
Difference-in-Differences in educational CDF; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data  
 
Years of 
schooling  DiD in CDF  Robust s.e. 
6  0.403  (0.03) 
7  0.363  (0.03) 
8  0.361  (0.05) 
9  0.170  (0.22) 
10  0.232  (0.04) 
11  0.215  (0.06) 
12  0.084  (0.06) 
13  0.104  (0.06) 
14  0.138  (0.11) 
15  -0.081  (0.07) 
16  -0.101  (0.14) 
17  -0.009  (0.15) 
Note: Reported values are regression coefficients on interactions between years of schooling and the treatment indicator. 
Linear regressions are performed on pooled male and female sample in order to increase estimation precision. Small 
sample  size  for  6  and  9  years  of  schooling.  Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses  for  the  hypotheses  that  DiD 
coefficients are signficantly different from the control group. Regressions control for age, year and gender dummies as 




Robustness check: Difference-in-Differences in pension gain; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












for potential  
pension growth 
         
Treatment effect  0.134***  0.169***  0.164***  0.130*** 
  (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.040) 
Retirement age  0.403***  0.536***  0.471***  0.432*** 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.028) 
Post-reform   -0.034  -0.054  -0.041  -0.035 
  (0.024)  (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.021) 
Potential pension growth      0.240**  0.421*** 
      (0.101)  (0.055) 
Average predicted pension growth      142%  165% 
Constant  0.221***  0.233***  -0.115  -0.540*** 
  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.146)  (0.084) 
Observations  1886  1056  1097  1845 
R-squared  0.245  0.358  0.276  0.293 
Note:Linear probability models with dependent variable: retired. Potential pension growth is calculated as growth rate in 
predicted pension benefits between 2003 and 2005 for specific gender, education, regional and settlement type groups. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Source: UHBS; author’s calculations 59 
 
 
Table 24  
Effect of pension increase on absolute and relative deprivation; UHBS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 
  Probability of exceeding 
absolute poverty line 
Relative position to mean 
 
Probability of exceeding 
absolute poverty line 
 
Relative position to mean 
 
  Narrow group  Broad group  Narrow group  Broad group  Narrow group  Broad group  Narrow group  Broad group 
 
Treatment effect  0.163***  0.227***  0.185**  0.135**  0.190***  0.229***  0.242***  0.132*** 
  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.083)  (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.074)  (0.047) 
Retirment age  0.041  0.005  0.074  -0.005  0.019  -0.014  0.055  0.002 
  (0.029)  (0.019)  (0.046)  (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.040)  (0.031) 
Post-reform  0.362***  0.326***  -0.049  -0.094**  0.333***  0.310***  -0.126**  -0.136*** 
  (0.037)  (0.029)  (0.058)  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.040) 
Constant  0.262***  0.264***  1.014***  1.060***  -0.423***  -0.330***  0.015  0.194** 
  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.098)  (0.059)  (0.163)  (0.094) 
Full controls  —  —  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Observations  2016  5026  2016  5026  2016  5026  2016  5026 
R-squared  0.200  0.228  0.012  0.002  0.355  0.355  0.262  0.220 
Note: Regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6) are linear probability models. Regressions for full sample of men and women. Narrow group comprises one year prior and one 
year post retirement age. Broad group comprises two years prior and four years post retirement age. Probability of exceeding absolute poverty line compares total 
individual disposable income to the 2.15 USD absolute poverty line (PPP adjusted). Relative position calculated with respect to the gender specific yearly mean of 




Table 25  
Robustness checks 1 & 2; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Robustness check 1: Probit specification, marginal effects reported 
 
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.226***  0.213***  0.209**  0.206**  0.223***  0.225*** 
  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Observations  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097  1097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.209  0.263  0.310  0.316  0.325  0.328 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.170***  0.173***  0.147**  0.147**  0.151**  0.152** 
  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.065) 
Observations  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845  1845 
Pseudo R-squared  0.226  0.285  0.347  0.347  0.348  0.352 
 
 
           
Robustness check 2: Omission of those below minimum working year threshold 
 
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.180***  0.160***  0.162***  0.157***  0.163***  0.163*** 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Constant  0.226***  0.174**  -56.762*  -54.972*  -56.023*  -56.862* 
  (0.028)  (0.078)  (32.678)  (32.540)  (32.414)  (32.392) 
Observations  1063  1063  1063  1063  1063  1063 
R-squared  0.260  0.317  0.372  0.376  0.386  0.388 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.137***  0.125***  0.098**  0.097**  0.100***  0.103*** 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Constant  0.115***  0.057  25.209  25.069  25.774  23.858 
  (0.015)  (0.061)  (18.700)  (18.724)  (18.707)  (18.620) 
Observations  1806  1806  1806  1806  1806  1806 
R-squared  0.266  0.321  0.388  0.388  0.389  0.392 
             
Region & Place FE  —   X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Industry structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 61 
 
Table 26  
Robustness checks 3 & 4; dependent variable: retired; UHBS data 
 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Robustness check 3: Comparison 2002/03 vs. 2004/05 
 
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.114**  0.101**  0.088*  0.085*  0.089*  0.090* 
  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Constant  0.215***  0.142**  -51.110*  -49.833*  -50.366*  -51.078* 
  (0.027)  (0.067)  (28.093)  (28.090)  (27.952)  (27.901) 
Observations  1436  1436  1436  1436  1436  1436 
R-squared  0.273  0.311  0.354  0.357  0.363  0.364 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.113***  0.102***  0.088***  0.087***  0.089***  0.090*** 
  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Constant  0.111***  0.044  24.929  24.946  25.207  24.155 
  (0.015)  (0.048)  (16.228)  (16.225)  (16.222)  (16.151) 
Observations  2465  2465  2465  2465  2465  2465 
R-squared  0.280  0.333  0.380  0.380  0.380  0.383 
             
 
Robustness check 4: Comparison 2002 vs. 2005 
 
Men 
           
Treatment effect  0.127**  0.106*  0.120*  0.120*  0.115*  0.115* 
  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.062) 
Constant  0.185***  0.099  -56.734  -53.933  -52.220  -52.989 
  (0.034)  (0.087)  (36.587)  (36.596)  (36.600)  (36.687) 
Observations  717  717  717  717  717  717 
R-squared  0.342  0.387  0.412  0.415  0.420  0.422 
 
Women 
           
Treatment effect  0.165***  0.172***  0.149***  0.149***  0.154***  0.152*** 
  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Constant  0.129***  0.137*  41.624*  41.573*  42.279*  40.355* 
  (0.022)  (0.081)  (22.349)  (22.374)  (22.446)  (22.499) 
Observations  1257  1257  1257  1257  1257  1257 
R-squared  0.281  0.343  0.399  0.399  0.401  0.403 
             
Region & Place FE  —   X  X  X  X  X 
Individual controls  —  —  X  X  X  X 
Health controls  —  —  —  X  X  X 
Household controls  —  —  —  —  X  X 
Industry structure  —  —  —  —  —  X 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: UHBS; author’s calculations. 
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Table 27  
Data Overview ULMS 
Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
 
mean  min  max 
   
mean  min  max 
Yearly working hours  1959.1  0  4992 
   
1919.8  0  4680 
Actual working hours reference week  38.8  0  98 
   
39.3  0  90 
Normal weekly working hours  41.2  3  98 
   
40.2  0  90 
Yearly working weeks  47.47  0  52 
   
47.47  4  52 
Share working less than full-time  0.061  0  1 
   
0.073  0  1 
 
  Pre-reform period 




mean  min  max 
   
mean  min  max 
Male  0.383  0  1 
   
0.376  0  1 
Married  0.786  0  1 
   
0.743  0  1 
Age  53.8  43  65 
   
57.5  47  68 
Chronic disease  0.676  0  1 
   
0.680  0  1 
Years of schooling  11.6  4  15 
   
11.6  4  15 
Household size  3.1  1  13 
   
3.0  1  9 
Presence of children (0-17 years)  0.307  0  1 
   
0.265  0  1 
Income from other household members  492.7  0  8650 
   
1088.7  0  8376.1 
Kiev  0.038  0  1 
   
0.041  0  1 
East  0.268  0  1 
   
0.260  0  1 
West  0.197  0  1 
   
0.204  0  1 
Center  0.272  0  1 
   
0.277  0  1 
South  0.191  0  1 
   
0.218  0  1 
Rural  0.362  0  1 
   
0.369  0  1 
Note: Number of observations in pre-reform period is 1,252 and in post-reform period is 626. Source: ULMS; author’s calculations 63 
 
Appendix: Changes in cohort densities and educational distribution 
 
The RD estimator will only be unbiased under the assumption that we compare very similar people. 
However, as the UHBS data are formed of cross-sections, the cohorts change as time passes. The 
cohort  aged  60  in  2003 will  be  62 in  2005  and so  the  counterfactual  is  not straightforward  to 
determine. As shown in Table 2, the comparison cohorts are very similar with respect to observable 
characteristics, however, two problems arise: First, the educational composition of the cohorts under 
consideration is changing strongly as a result of the educational expansion in the Soviet Union. 
Between  1958  and  1963,  basic  secondary  education  became  compulsory  throughout  the  Soviet 
Union and the enhancement of educational attainments across cohorts can still be traced in the data 
(Table A1). The share of those with at least twelve years of schooling increased from 45 to 50 
percent within only two years. However, labor supply and retirement levels are strongly determined 
by educational attainment. Not accounting for the education composition effects will lead to biases 
in the estimation of the treatment effects. This problem can be resolved by distinguishing between 
groups of those holding vs. those without a higher educational degree. Albeit there was a general 
educational expansion in the USSR, the reforms influencing the cohorts under consideration here are 
mainly those which increased enrolment of pupils into secondary education. 
 
Table A1: Compositional change in educational attainments 
 
Age 45-65  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Average years of schooling  11.3  11.4  11.6  11.7  11.8 
Composition shares           
At least 12 years of schooling  44.6  45.4  47.7  49.8  50.1 
Higher education  17.2  18.4  18.7  19.3  18.9 
Secondary education  61.1  64.0  66.7  68.7  71.0 
Lower education  21.8  17.6  14.6  12.0  10.1 
Source: UHBS; author's calculation         
 
A  second  issue  of  the  estimates  concerns  precision:  The  density  of  birth  cohorts  around  the 
discontinuity threshold is unequal between years, however, this effect is obviously not caused by 
sorting around the threshold (a main cause for rendering RD applications invalid) but by relatively 
small birth cohorts during WWII. Therefore, some variation in the densities of observations to the 
left  and  the  right  of  the  discontinuity  threshold  prevail.  As  Figure  A1  indicates,  the  change  in 
densities  is  especially  relevant  for  men:  Between  2003  and  2005,  the  war-related  smaller  birth 64 
 
cohorts move from the left side of the discontinuity to the right side, resulting in lower precision of 
the polynomial regressions below the discontinuity in 2003 and above the discontinuity in 2005. 
 
Figure A1 
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Graphs by UHBS wave
 
Note: The vertical lines indicate the relevant retirement age for state pensions. The differences in densities do obviously 
not reflect sorting around the threshold, but reflect different sizes of birth cohorts of the Ukrainian population. For men, 
the threshold „moves“ through the years of the WWII birth cohorts, producing low densities below (2003) or above 
(2005) retirement age. Source: UHBS 2003 and 2005; author’s calculations. 